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RISE OF THE DIGITAL REGULATOR 
RORY VAN LOO† 
ABSTRACT 
  The administrative state is leveraging algorithms to influence 
individuals’ private decisions. Agencies have begun to write rules to 
shape for-profit websites such as Expedia and have launched their own 
online tools such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
mortgage calculator. These digital intermediaries aim to guide people 
toward better schools, healthier food, and more savings. But 
enthusiasm for this regulatory paradigm rests on two questionable 
assumptions. First, digital intermediaries effectively police consumer 
markets. Second, they require minimal government involvement. 
Instead, some for-profit online advisers such as travel websites have 
become what many mortgage brokers were before the 2008 financial 
crisis. Although they make buying easier, they can also subtly advance 
their interests at the expense of those they serve. Publicly run 
alternatives lack accountability or—like the Affordable Care Act 
health-insurance exchanges—are massive undertakings. The 
unpleasant truth is that creating effective digital regulators would 
require investing heavily in a new oversight regime or sophisticated 
state machines. Either path would benefit from an interdisciplinary 
uniform process to modernize administrative, antitrust, commercial, 
and intellectual property laws. Ideally, a technology meta-agency 
would then help keep that legal framework updated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Policymakers increasingly rely on machines to nudge people 
toward better choices. Spurred by White House directives, 
administrative agencies have written rules to empower for-profit price-
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comparison engines, such as those used to purchase airline tickets.1 
Diverse agencies also operate their own interactive websites that aid 
tens of millions of visitors in planning a meal,2 choosing a school,3 or 
owning a home.4 
These digital intermediaries5 are the latest generation of 
behavioral economics policy tools. They “regulate” by influencing 
behavior in ways similar to public actors.6 As legal scholars, 
economists, and psychologists have shown in recent decades, people 
often lack key information and make suboptimal decisions based on 
the information they do have.7 Businesses exacerbate these 
shortcomings through intentionally complex “marketing schemes.”8 
Precisely estimating the impact of these problems is difficult. 
 
 1. See Enhanced Protections for Airline Passengers, 14 C.F.R. § 259.5 (2016) (requiring 
airlines to disclose online any “lowest fare offered” elsewhere); U.S. Dep’t of Transp., U.S. 
Department of Transportation Announces Enhanced Protections for Air Travelers,  
Actions to Promote Airline Competition, TRANSPORTATION.GOV (Oct. 18, 2016), https://
www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-department-transportation-announces-enhanced-prot
ections-air-travelers-actions [https://perma.cc/G2N9-HHKV]; Memorandum from Cass R. 
Sunstein, Administrator, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, Informing Consumers Through Smart Disclosure 2 (Sept. 8, 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/informing-consumers-
through-smart-disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8CE-KFQ8] (directing all administrative 
agencies to pursue “smart disclosures” so that “agencies or third-party intermediaries may . . . 
create tools that use these data sets to provide services that support consumer decision-making”). 
 2. See Comment Request–SuperTracker Information Collection for Registration, Login, 
and Food Intake and Physical Activity Assessment Information, 80 Fed. Reg. 17,714, 17,714–15 
(Apr. 2, 2015); SuperTracker, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.supertracker.usda.gov [https://
perma.cc/223Y-VFGX].  
 3. See Todd Park & Jim Shelton, Open Data for College Affordability and Better  
Student Outcomes, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 12, 2012, 1:11 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2012/07/12/open-data-college-affordability-and-better-student-outcomes [https://perma.cc/
6YHL-QWTP].  
 4. Owning a Home, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
owning-a-home [https://perma.cc/5649-VXFS].  
 5. “Digital intermediaries” in this Article refers to the interactive online applications that 
help people make market decisions. The focus here is on those that receive input from the 
consumer and algorithmically analyze all sources of data available to provide an output. People 
can then rely on that output to choose a course of action. Other possible terms for the same 
concept include information intermediaries, choice engines, and information aggregators.  
 6. See infra Part V.B. This use of “regulate” appears widely in the literature on private 
actors and public regulation. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing 
Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 199, 201 (2012); Ryan 
Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 775 (2014). 
 7. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473–77 (1998). 
 8. See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and 
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 505–06 (2006). 
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Economists have found that consumers consequently overpay for a 
range of products, including around 8 percent on cell phone plans,9 up 
to 9 percent for computer accessories,10 and 30 percent for health 
insurance.11 Borrowers have incurred billions of dollars annually in 
unexpected fees on credit cards.12 Workers save too little for 
retirement.13 Students attend schools they should have avoided.14 
One of the most prominent policy responses has been to try to 
position consumers to make better decisions by providing information 
directly to them. Businesses might, for example, be required to 
prominently display the calories on a menu or the fees on a monthly 
bill. However, commentators have broadly criticized this first 
generation of “mandated disclosures” as ineffective, in part because 
people have difficulty using the information disclosed.15 
In contrast to disclosures intended for consumers, disclosures 
intended for sophisticated intermediaries are seen as more promising 
because those intermediaries are less susceptible to behavioral biases 
and cognitive limitations.16 Accordingly, scholars have proposed 
 
 9. See Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Pricing Misperceptions: Explaining Pricing 
Structure in the Cell Phone Service Market, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 430, 453 (2012). 
 10. See Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on 
the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 427–29 (2009). 
 11. See Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: 
Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1180, 1190 
(2011); Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Comparison Friction: Experimental Evidence from Medicare Drug 
Plans, 127 Q.J. ECON. 199, 215 (2012). The higher price equilibrium may result from diverse 
behavioral and informational factors varying by person and product. 
 12. Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomisengphet, Neal Mahoney & Johannes Stroebel, 
Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards, 130 Q. J. ECON. 111, 111 
(2015). 
 13. See Daniel Shaviro, Multiple Myopias, Multiple Selves, and the Under-Saving Problem, 
47 CONN. L. REV. 1215, 1217 (2015). 
 14. See Jacob Alderdice, The Informed Student-Consumer: Regulating For-Profit Colleges by 
Disclosure, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 215, 254 (2015). 
 15. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647, 647, 649–51 (2011). It is also difficult for regulators to know the best options for 
each individual. See id. Better design of disclosures may address some of this ineffectiveness. See 
infra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
 16. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 93–94 (2008) (noting that machine-readable 
disclosures “greatly improve people’s ability to make good choices”); Lisa Bernstein & Hagay 
Volvovsky, Not What You Wanted To Know: The Real Deal and the Paper Deal in Consumer 
Contracts—Comments on the Work of Florencia Marott-Wurgler, 12 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL 
STUD. 128, 134–35 (“Promising directions include . . . mandating the creation of information 
intermediaries that have the potential to aggregate and transmit the information about the real 
terms of these transactions that consumers would most like to know.”); Samuel Issacharoff, 
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mandated digital disclosures for assorted goals. These include (1) 
health inspectors making their restaurant grades available online so 
that dining search websites can include cleanliness scores;17 (2) wireless 
carriers giving consumers their personal cell phone usage data in 
spreadsheets so intermediaries can analyze which carrier’s plan would 
save the most money;18 (3) large retailers such as Amazon, Walmart, 
and Target sharing their price databases so shopping apps can tell 
people which stores offer the greatest savings;19 and (4) financial firms 
releasing voluminous unfiltered data for analysis by artificially 
intelligent “cyborg” investors.20 Even scholars criticizing the “failure of 
mandated disclosures” acknowledge that digital intermediaries such as 
Yelp may better achieve the same policy goals by giving consumers 
what they need: not information, but advice.21 
Despite digital intermediaries’ growing use, widespread support, 
and potentially sizable societal benefits as policy tools, scholars have 
mostly only mentioned them in passing.22 Administrative law 
scholarship has not, to my knowledge, engaged the topic.23 This Article 
 
Disclosure, Agents, and Consumer Protection, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 56, 
56, 66 (2001) (“Instead of further overwhelming consumers with information . . . efforts to aid 
beleaguered consumers should take the form of facilitating a market for intermediaries . . . .”). 
 17. See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 
122 YALE L.J. 574, 650–51 (2012) (“All jurisdictions should follow New York’s lead and release 
full health-inspection data in machine-readable form.”). 
 18. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 93–94; Bar-Gill & Stone, supra note 9, at 453. 
 19. See Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need For Supervision of Big Retail, 163 
U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1387–88 (2015). Other proposals for disclosures that would empower digital 
intermediaries exist in the literature. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 66 (proposing for 
insurance a “searchable electronic disclosure form” that would enable “online comparison 
quotes”).  
 20. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 602 (2014). 
 21. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 15, at 647, 746–47 (2011) (generally 
criticizing the “failure of mandated disclosures” but suggesting that the most promising path 
forward may lie in sophisticated intermediaries such as price-comparison sites). 
 22. See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails 
and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1652 (2014); supra notes 17–21.  
 23. The public side of digital regulators lies in uncharted territory at the intersection of 
internet governance, privatization, and administrative law. Arguably the most likely fit, internet 
governance, has yet to address digital intermediaries as governmental market-regulatory tools in 
any sustained manner partly because that literature has often focused on more rights-related—
rather than commercially related—interests. More broadly, the seminal internet law scholarship 
does not focus on the state’s reliance on digital tools to influence decisions. See, e.g., YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS 
AND FREEDOM 20–23, 34 (2006) (focusing on social and political opportunities and expressing 
concern that old “producers of information, culture, and communications—like Hollywood, the 
recording industry, and perhaps the broadcasters and some of the telecommunications services 
giants” will retain control of content and infrastructure); Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and 
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explains how, upon closer examination, digital intermediaries as 
regulatory instruments prove far more challenging than assumed. At 
the outset, it is complicated and resource intensive to design useful 
machine-readable disclosures as technology changes, businesses resist, 
and laws obstruct. If successful in providing for-profit digital 
intermediaries with the data they need to guide consumers to make 
optimal decisions, policymakers have no guarantee those 
intermediaries will not use their power to steer consumers toward 
suboptimal, or even harmful, decisions. Some, such as travel websites, 
have become so dominant that they may raise consumer prices overall 
by imposing inefficient price-restraint clauses on businesses.24 Rather 
than being a form of “regulation for conservatives” that preserves 
choice,25 machine-readable disclosures risk empowering digital 
intermediaries to limit choice.26 
Moreover, to earn higher commissions digital intermediaries skew 
search results without disclosing their bias.27 There is little doubt that 
online comparison sites make shopping easier by facilitating product 
comparisons. However, just as cell phone, credit card, and mortgage 
companies design their products, prices, and contracts to profit from 
consumer misperceptions,28 digital intermediaries can do the same 
through their search engines and web interfaces. “Seduction by 
contract”29 now proceeds alongside seduction by algorithm. 
Publicly run alternatives face their own accountability flaws. 
Although agencies lack the same incentives to manipulate consumers 
 
Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
105, 106–07, 121 (2010) (exploring “the noneconomic threats that dominant intermediaries pose, 
particularly in terms of privacy, reputation, and democratic culture”); Jonathan L. Zittrain, The 
Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1977, 1999 (2006) (discussing regulatory options for 
strengthening the generative nature of the internet). 
 24. See Benjamin G. Edelman & Julian Wright, Price Coherence and Excessive 
Intermediation, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1283, 1283, 1311 (2015) (finding that, when intermediaries restrict 
the seller from charging buyers less who purchase directly, a reduction in consumer surplus and 
consumer welfare can result).  
 25. Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew 
Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric 
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1211–12 (2003). But see JOSEPH SINGER, NO FREEDOM 
WITHOUT REGULATION: THE HIDDEN LESSON OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 2–4 (2015) (arguing 
that regulation is crucial for freedom). 
 26. See infra Parts II.C, V.A. 
 27. See infra Part II.B. The Department of Transportation (DOT) recently passed rules 
regulating such conduct. See U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, supra note 1. 
 28. See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 7–22 (2012). 
 29. See id. 
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for profit, their online tools can be captured by businesses or shut down 
by new political leaders. Nor is there any clear procedural framework 
for state-run machines that influence private decisions. Some agencies 
such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have gone 
through notice and comment for their online tools, while others such 
as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) have not.30 The 
literature and doctrine provide few direct answers but indirectly raise 
issues. For example, internet governance scholars have articulated the 
powerful ways in which digital architecture shapes online behavior. 
One influential view holds that, in cyberspace, computer code is law. It 
plays this role because of how it constrains the behavior of those 
browsing the web.31 Linking that view to this Article’s depiction of 
digital intermediaries as regulatory instruments would suggest that 
digital intermediaries’ computer code is not merely the law of 
cyberspace but increasingly the law of markets. To be sure, bureaucrats 
writing computer code are not engaging in agency rulemaking. 
However, agencies have little guidance as to when creating digital tools 
wielding potentially great market influence conflicts with the 
legitimacy foundations of the administrative state. 
The breadth of laws implicated underscores the complexity facing 
a policymaker today who might seek to regulate through digital 
intermediaries. Agencies cannot know whether markets need a public 
digital intermediary without first analyzing whether private digital 
intermediaries will suffice. Understanding that tradeoff requires 
predicting whether varied laws—including intellectual property,32 
antitrust, and consumer protection—will help or hurt regulatory 
efforts. It is no small assignment for a decisionmaker in one agency to 
divine how different agencies and courts will apply distinct laws to 
transformative technologies. Additionally, if a specific digital 
intermediary exhibits features of a natural monopoly, possibilities 
would include treating it as a public utility or common carrier,33 or a 
 
 30. See infra Part V.B.  
 31. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 5 (2d ed. 2006) (“[C]ode is cyberspace’s ‘law.’”). 
 32. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kenneth Hirschey, Symbiotic Relationships: Pragmatic Acceptance of 
Data Scraping, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 918 (2014) (discussing legal strategies that websites 
use to block data collection). 
 33. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1208–09 (2008) (recommending 
considering adaptation of public-utility frameworks for information-age businesses such as search 
engines); Christopher S. Yoo, Is There a Role for Common Carriage in an Internet-Based World?, 
51 HOUS. L. REV. 545, 608 (2013) (recommending looking at historical shortcomings of common 
carriage when considering that approach for “regulating Internet-based services”). 
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model akin to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
oversight of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), a private entity.34 
Finally, before deciding to operate a public digital intermediary, the 
policymaker should predict the likelihood that bureaucrats can build 
their own high-tech tool and adapt it to fast-changing markets. 
One policy response could be to abandon both public and private 
digital intermediaries as agents of more efficient markets or as 
substitutes for traditional regulations.35 Alternatively, if the digital 
regulator paradigm persists, it needs a legal framework that supports 
it. Today’s law of digital intermediaries is like that of commercial law 
in the early 1900s, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC)—arguably “the most successful codification in American 
law.”36 As one UCC drafter put it, “Horse law and haystack law are 
uneasily tolerated in the complex business of mass production and 
national distribution.”37 Similarly, laws written for an era of paper-and-
pencil analyses are inapt in a world of artificially intelligent decisions.  
The first step in upgrading the legal framework would ideally be 
some kind of centralized lawmaking initiative. The goal would be to 
bring together interdisciplinary experts—in computer science, 
economics, psychology, and law—to provide a set of model rules and 
guidelines for agencies, courts, and legislatures at both the federal and 
state levels. The second key institution would be a federal agency—
whether existing or new—with an expansive technology mandate. 
From an institutional perspective, centralized ex ante rulemaking 
offers the best chance to design a set of truly interdependent 
administrative, antitrust, consumer protection, commercial, and 
intellectual property laws. Absent some such comprehensive reform, it 
would be wise to abandon notions that more digitally intermediated 
decisions better regulate markets. 
The Article is structured as follows. Part I provides an overview of 
the faith placed in digital intermediaries as regulatory tools and offers 
a taxonomy to aid in analyzing digital intermediaries. Part II lays out 
the main reasons private digital intermediaries may fail to achieve the 
 
 34. See infra Part V.A. 
 35. Private digital intermediaries would be viewed solely as companies offering a new, 
complex product. Regulators would then need to take a fresh look at what oversight of digital 
intermediaries is appropriate, as they would for any other product market. 
 36. Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant 
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 466 (1987). 
 37. Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341, 
1341 (1948). 
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policy goals expected of them, including inadequate information, 
protectionist laws, deception, and anticompetitive conduct. Part III 
looks in depth at two public intermediaries: the Affordable Care Act’s 
(ACA) health-insurance exchanges and the CFPB’s mortgage rate 
checker. Part IV explores substantive legal changes needed to have 
greater confidence that digital intermediaries were improving markets. 
Part V identifies accountability issues raised by the regulatory state’s 
increasing reliance on computer algorithms to influence decisions. 
Finally, Part VI discusses options for pursuing unified legal reform.  
I.  THE PROMISE OF DIGITAL INTERMEDIARIES 
Digital intermediaries are widely lauded. When small start-ups or 
large businesses such as Amazon launch new price-comparison tools, 
the media rejoices at the “game changer.”38 Regulators and academics 
hold out as models the industries in which consumers use those tools.39 
The support for digital intermediaries has two main foundations. The 
first is the belief that digital intermediaries can level the playing field 
between consumers and businesses. The second is the view of digital 
intermediaries as enabling less restrictive and less resource-intensive 
regulation. This Part explores these two drivers of appeal. Then, it 
offers a taxonomy for digital intermediaries. 
A. Digital Intermediaries as Market Equalizers 
One of the fundamental goals of consumer law is to advance 
consumer welfare. Yet public officials cannot regulate every 
transaction. Consequently, policymakers aim for markets to self-
regulate as much as possible.40 Digital intermediaries have become 
integral to this aspiration. 
 
 38. See, e.g., Amazon’s Price Check App: A Game-Changer for Retail?, RADIO BOS. (Dec. 
19, 2011), http://radioboston.wbur.org/2011/12/19/amazon-price-check [https://perma.cc/E5MQ-
FKAX]. 
 39. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of 
Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 679 (2012) (“Use your phone’s camera to scan the 
bar code on a potential purchase, and Amazon or Consumer Reports will instantly return price 
comparisons and consumer reviews.”). 
 40. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING 
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3, 101–05 (1992). 
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Rational41 and informed consumer decisionmaking is important 
for self-regulated markets. When a sufficient42 number of consumers 
can easily and quickly know which companies offer the best deals, 
understand the full implications of a purchase, and compare offerings, 
it is more difficult for a company to engage in unfair and deceptive 
business practices. One of the central challenges in consumer market 
regulation is that consumers often lack the information they need to 
make optimal decisions. Or they suboptimally process the information 
that is available. 
Businesses can strategically profit from suboptimal decisions. 
They may provide excess information, such as longer product 
descriptions that make it harder to figure out whether two products are 
comparable.43 Or they design complex pricing packages, as 
telecommunications companies do with teaser rates, multiple data 
levels, and back-end fees, which make it difficult to know which 
package is cheaper.44 
One source of hope in recent years is mandating disclosures.45 
More companies have to disclose the calories on menus, the interest 
rates of payday loans, or the defects in used cars. The goal is for 
individuals to use this disclosed information to make better decisions. 
Disclosures have in some contexts, such as changing the description of 
Medicare plan choices, produced more optimal results.46 Simple scores, 
such as those used in restaurant hygiene or for annual percentage rates 
 
 41. Rational choices here are those that maximize a party’s interests given the information 
and choices available. It may be rational not to spend the time and energy to find the optimal 
deal. 
 42. In theory, a minority of informed consumers may sufficiently regulate the market. See 
Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638–39 (1979). But see Oren Bar-Gill & 
Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2008) (arguing that the 
“informed minority” does not have the power to “drive the market”). 
 43. See Ellison & Ellison, supra note 10, at 427. 
 44. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Stone, supra note 9, at 456.  
 45. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 1–5. 
 46. In one field experiment, altering a few phrases in letters sent to Medicare patients saved 
consumers 5 percent on prescription drug costs. See Kling et al., supra note 11, at 215. 
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(APR), also have promise.47 Thus, it is possible that with improved 
design mandated disclosures could produce better results.48 
However, some contend mandated disclosures have failed to meet 
expectations.49 Even well-designed disclosures can fail because the 
effectiveness of a consumer’s choice is relative to the context. 
Importantly, that context is dynamic. As products and pricing become 
more complex, with increasingly technological products and more 
numerous choices, a previously helpful disclosure may become 
insufficient. Also, sellers respond to disclosures in ways that 
purposefully undermine their helpfulness .50 
The struggle for optimal consumer decisionmaking has gone 
technological. Businesses are locked in a multi-billion-dollar “arms 
race” to develop big data sets; purchase advanced computers; and hire 
the brightest employees with PhDs in economics, statistics, and 
psychology.51 With artificially intelligent computers that engage in 
“deep learning” similar to that of the human mind,52 retailers “nudge 
customers to higher-margin products.”53 To counter, administrative 
agencies have invested millions of dollars in building interactive 
 
 47. See Oren Bar-Gill, Defending (Smart) Disclosure: A Comment on More Than You 
Wanted to Know, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 75, 76 (2015) (acknowledging the failure of 
full disclosure but arguing for smart disclosure). But see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. 
SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW 133–35 (2014) (offering reasons why score 
disclosures are unlikely to prove successful). Professor Ryan Bubb has argued that Professors 
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider’s criticism addresses disclosures aimed at providing 
information for slow thinking (System 2), but disclosures aimed at influencing faster thinking 
(System 1) may have greater promise. See Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of 
Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1026–28 (2015). 
 48. See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 545 (2014). 
 49. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 15, at 651. 
 50. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 
1183–84 (2013) (summarizing the failures of overdraft fees’ mandated disclosures due to banks’ 
responses). 
 51. See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.  
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/
9T87-7FQV]. 
 52. The technique recently powered a computer that, much to the surprise of experts, 
soundly beat the world’s leading player of the board game Go—a game much more complicated 
than chess and long thought by experts to be beyond the realm of computer dominance. See Scott 
Santens, Robots Will Take Your Job, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2016, at K1. 
 53. See Stefan Biesdorf, David Court & Paul Willmott, Big Data: What’s Your Plan? Many 
Companies Don’t Have One. Here’s How To Get Started., MCKINSEY Q. (Mar. 2013), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/big-data-whats-your-
plan [https://perma.cc/QHU9-PQA2]. 
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websites and putting together teams of quantitative experts.54 These 
government sites move well beyond traditional information 
dissemination. They receive an input from an individual, 
algorithmically analyze that input alongside market data, and provide 
a tailored output.55 
Because agencies are significantly out-resourced, they view 
private digital intermediaries as allies in promoting optimal consumer 
decisions. Private digital intermediaries leverage their own big data, 
artificial intelligence, and “the hive mind” of millions of other internet 
users.56 For example, financial technology (“FinTech”) companies such 
as NerdWallet, Credit Karma, Digit, and Mint collect all relevant 
financial information by connecting online to a consumer’s bank 
accounts, credit cards, and bills. They analyze this data to provide 
advice, such as which of thousands of credit cards, CDs, or IRA 
accounts would offer the best rates or lowest fees, drawing on what 
similar consumers have done.57 Use of these sites has skyrocketed in 
recent years. As one systems engineer who uses the FinTech company 
Digit put it, “I’m someone who places complete faith in technology to 
make smarter decisions than I would.”58 Over the past five years, the 
financial aggregator Mint has seen its users increase sixfold to 20 
million.59 Credit Karma has over 50 million users.60 
Policymakers’ growing reliance on these digital intermediaries 
stems in part from the need for regulation to respond dynamically to 
market changes. Whereas businesses may undermine mandated 
disclosures aimed directly at consumers, businesses have a harder time 
outmaneuvering nimble digital intermediaries wielding the latest 
 
 54. The CFPB has invested millions in information technologies. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, THE CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND PERFORMANCE PLAN AND REPORT 
11−15 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201502_
cfpb_report_strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan_FY2014-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/RN
98-69VU]. 
 55. See infra Part III. 
 56. See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 15–17 (2004). 
 57. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Mary Pilon, The Great Customer Courtship—Banks Are 
Rolling Out New Incentives To Win Your Business, WALL STREET J., Feb. 12, 2011, at B7; About 
Us, NERDWALLET, www.nerdwallet.com [https://perma.cc/W277-WHSZ]; How It Works, MINT, 
www.mint.com/how-mint-works [https://perma.cc/Q8UZ-ZPN4]. 
 58. See Daniel Huang & Peter Rudegeair, Bank of America Cut Off Finance Sites from Its 
Data, WALL STREET J., Nov. 10, 2015, at C1. 
 59. See id.  
 60. See Press Release, Credit Karma, Credit Karma Now Serves 50 Million Members (Jan. 
28, 2016), https://www.creditkarma.com/about/releases/credit-karma-fifty-50-million-members 
[https://perma.cc/L7SA-82LL]. 
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technologies. As a result, policymakers wanting self-regulation have 
understandably looked to digital intermediaries to level the playing 
field. 
B. Digital Intermediaries as Minimally Intrusive Regulation 
Digital intermediaries are believed to offer a light regulatory 
option by both requiring minimal governmental involvement and 
preserving choice. In terms of minimizing government involvement, 
machine-readable disclosures are thought to shift work from agencies 
to businesses. With traditional disclosures aimed directly at people, 
such as a nutrition label or a loan’s APR, producing “even modest 
results” requires “epic effort, ingenuity, and persistence.”61 Studies 
suggest people rarely read disclosures or misunderstand them when 
they do.62 Disclosures even cause results opposite to those intended.63 
In contrast, when the government releases machine-readable data 
in raw form or mandates disclosures, an entrepreneur determines how 
best to communicate that data to consumers. For example, to combat 
excessive fees by investment funds that cost retirees billions of dollars 
annually,64 the federal government began releasing data on 401(k) fund 
managers.65 Companies such as BrightScope have used the released 
401(k) data to start websites enabling users to compare 401(k) plan 
performance.66 As scholars have argued, sophisticated intermediaries 
can use artificial intelligence to sift through large volumes of unfiltered 
information and rigorously analyze it, theoretically saving 
governmental decisionmakers from having to closely design direct-to-
consumer disclosures.67 For those who either have little faith in the 
state to take on challenging tasks or want to reduce the resources 
needed to govern, the prospect of a business voluntarily taking on 
disclosures is appealing. 
 
 61. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 48, at 116–17. 
 62. See id. at 42–47. 
 63. See id. at 116. 
 64. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of 
Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1480 (2015) (stating 
that a ten-basis-point reduction in mutual-fund fees can save 401(k) plans $4.4 billion annually). 
 65. See, e.g., Vivek Wadhwa, The Goldmine of Opportunities in Gov 2.0, TECHCRUNCH 
(Oct. 23, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/10/23/the-goldmine-of-opportunities-in-gov-2-0 
[https://perma.cc/E7UZ-24L2]. 
 66. See id. (mentioning the company’s rise and profitability). 
 67. See Lin, supra note 20, at 602. 
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The second driver of light regulation, preserving individual 
autonomy, is relevant to both public and private digital intermediaries. 
Renters, for example, used to have almost no information about 
landlords in New York City, which left them “with little confidence 
that the leaky faucet [would] be fixed or the roaches [would] be 
vanquished.” Following city agencies’ release of complaints and 
violations online, however, a start-up called Rentlogic built an online 
searchable database consolidating landlord records and building 
ratings.68 Rather than issuing top-down rules prohibiting landlord 
conduct, an agency may accomplish similar goals by releasing machine-
readable data. Citizens can choose to carry on as before, but the 
increased visibility may give the market a better chance to discipline 
problematic behavior. 
The narrative created by machine-readable disclosures is one of 
unleashing the power of the digital economy to regulate itself: if the 
information is released, entrepreneurs will build online tools to 
improve consumers’ lives one decision at a time. Digital intermediaries 
are thus expected to advance policy more effectively and efficiently 
than other options. 
C. Types of Digital Intermediaries 
Digital intermediaries are pervasive and heterogeneous. To aid in 
analyzing this large universe of online tools, this Section offers a 
typology. Before articulating key distinctions, however, it is worth 
clarifying commonalities. This Article examines digital intermediaries 
that influence people’s decisions in transacting with private entities. 
Thus, these digital tools are separate from the consumers and end 
sellers that offer some good or service. This focus means that all types 
of digital intermediaries provide algorithmic advice. The advice may 
come in subtle forms, such as the order of search results. Or it may be 
more explicit, such as recommending waiting to buy airline tickets 
based on a prediction that prices will drop.69 
Three main distinctions between different types of intermediaries 
are useful for this Article’s core analysis. First, digital platforms that 
process a transaction between a consumer and a seller are called 
marketplaces. Others are informers. Second, the more an intermediary 
 
 68. See Ronda Kaysen, Grading the Landlord, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2016, at RE3. 
 69. See Kaiser Fung, When to Hold Out for a Lower Airfare, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 20, 
2014, 6:00 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/when-to-hold-out-for-a-lower-airfare [https://
perma.cc/EXL8-PY3U]. 
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favors some sellers over others, the more it is a promoter instead of a 
neutral. Third, intermediaries are either publicly or privately run. The 
business model, legal status, and regulatory implications vary for each 
category. 
1. Marketplaces Versus Informers.  Marketplaces accept payment 
from the consumer in exchange for a third-party seller providing a 
product. They generate much of their revenue from keeping a 
percentage of the transaction that they process or by buying the 
product and reselling it for a markup. Travelers go to the marketplace 
Expedia to purchase tickets for flights operated by United, Delta, or 
American Airlines. At Amazon, shoppers can buy jeans made by 
Calvin Klein or Levi.70 However, marketplaces may also produce their 
own goods or services in addition to selling those of others. Amazon, 
for example, is increasingly producing its own Amazon-branded 
products, ranging from soap to clothing.71 
Digital intermediaries that do not process a monetary transaction 
for third-party products are informers. Informers earn their revenues 
from selling information collected from the consumer, from 
subscriptions to their intermediary services, or through advertising. 
The mortgage and travel industries demonstrate the range of services 
offered by informers. Often the intermediary offers answers to specific 
financial questions. For example, many websites offer mortgage 
calculators for free.72 The borrower enters information such as zip code 
and income, and the calculator estimates the likely interest rate the 
borrower could attain. In a related service, mortgage holders can go to 
Bills.com or related sites and, after entering information, receive a 
“yes” or a “no” as to whether they should refinance.73 Some sites go a 
step further and list the specific financial institutions willing to lend at 
the rates provided.74 
 
 70. See, e.g., Ananya Bhattacharya, Amazon Launches Its Own Clothing Brands,  
VERGE (Feb. 23, 2016, 3:15 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/23/11099968/amazon-fashion-
launches-clothing-lines [https://perma.cc/9YW8-95HB]. 
 71. See Amazon Basics, AMAZON, www.amazon.com/AmazonBasics [https://perma.cc/L4
SC-6E8Z]. 
 72. See M.P. McQueen, Refinancing: Whom Can You Trust?, WALL STREET J., Sept. 18, 
2010, at B7.  
 73. See id. 
 74. See Get Your Mortgage Rates for Home Loans, BILLS.COM, http://www.bills.com/
mortgage-rates [https://perma.cc/SQG6-B8QS]. 
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In the travel industry, marketplaces and informers compete for 
control of consumers’ searches. The marketplaces Expedia and 
Travelocity were the early U.S. market leaders for searches. On those 
sites, consumers can purchase tickets. Now, however, 80 percent of all 
searches go through Kayak.75 The links in Kayak’s search results refer 
consumers either directly to sellers, such as Delta or American 
Airlines, or to marketplaces, such as Expedia and Travelocity, to make 
a purchase. 
2. Neutrals Versus Promoters.  Another key distinction is between 
neutrals and promoters. The extent to which an intermediary is more 
of a promoter, as opposed to a neutral, depends on the degree to which 
its automated advice is designed to earn more money by steering 
consumers toward certain products. This advice may or may not hurt 
the consumer. The distinction between neutrals and promoters is less 
binary and clear-cut than that between marketplaces and informers. 
Most digital intermediaries promote to some extent. Promotion 
can come in many forms. More intense promotion results when an 
intermediary receives a higher commission or markup for some 
products than for others. This promotion may be driven by the seller, 
just as banks have given mortgage brokers higher commissions for 
higher-priced loans.76 Or it may be driven by the intermediary’s 
business model. Marketplaces such as Amazon vary their markups on 
different products depending on the deals they get with sellers. They 
also earn higher markups from their own manufactured products (for 
example, Amazon batteries) than they do on products they purchase 
from third parties (for example, Duracell batteries).77 
In contrast to Amazon, eBay does not sell its own products and 
earns a flat commission on all sales. Accordingly, eBay is far more of a 
neutral, with little, if any, incentive to steer consumers toward specific 
products. To be sure, even more neutral marketplaces like eBay want 
to increase any given consumer’s overall purchases, since it would then 
earn a commission on a higher base. However, neutral marketplaces 
have far less incentive, if any, to nudge consumers toward higher-
 
 75. See Chabeli Herrera, Travel Search Engine Skyscanner Eyes U.S. Market After Miami 
Office Opens, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 28, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/
business/biz-monday/article62789137.html [https://perma.cc/58CE-N4EN]. 
 76. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for 
Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and 
Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1123, 1129–30, 1140 n.179 (1984). 
 77. See, e.g., Bhattacharya, supra note 70. 
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priced products since they earn only a fraction (typically about 10 
percent) of any price increase.78 Promoter marketplaces, such as 
Amazon, earn 100 percent of any price increase on a significant portion 
of their products. 
The existence of advertising may, but need not, decrease 
neutrality. Yelp, for example, allows paid advertising alongside users’ 
ratings of companies, but academics have found that Yelp does not bias 
search results in accordance with those advertisements.79 Instead, it 
distinguishes paid links from unpaid ones. Maintaining an air of 
neutrality is crucial for earning consumers’ trust and thus for 
profitability. Reputational concerns provide some market constraints 
on detectable bias. 
Pure neutrals are mostly nonprofits or publicly run companies, but 
they need not be. Craigslist is technically for-profit but has limited its 
revenues to certain posting categories, such as employers who want to 
list a job. The site has steadfastly refused advertisements or any 
manipulation of the results.80 Some sites earn money solely by 
collecting information. For example, Intuit offers a mortgage 
calculator into which consumers enter income, location, and credit 
score to obtain advice about mortgage options. The company sells the 
information collected to DoubleClick, an internet advertising firm 
owned by Google.81 Also, companies purchase informers’ information 
to estimate a consumer’s overall net worth, which then determines 
service levels, such as whether to direct a phone call to a VIP customer 
service line or to an unhelpful call center.82 The market value of data 
means mortgage calculators can be profitable even if designed to offer 
unbiased analysis. 
Generally, marketplaces and promoters establish closer legal 
relationships with sellers than do informers and neutrals. Informers can 
provide information and analysis to consumers about a third-party 
seller regardless of whether that seller cooperates. But to process a 
transaction on behalf of a seller, marketplaces must generally establish 
 
 78. Nudging consumers toward higher prices risks making them purchase nothing.  
 79. See Michael Luca & Georgios Zervas, Fake It Till You Make It: Reputation, Competition, 
and Yelp Review Fraud, 62 MGMT. SCI. 3412, 3426 (2016). 
 80. See Steven Rosenbaum, The Craigslist Economy Is Booming, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2015, 
10:38 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenrosenbaum/2015/01/26/the-craigslist-economy-is-
booming/#31209c5a7c1e [https://perma.cc/26QE-Y3TV]. 
 81. See Glenn R. Simpson, Intuit Acts to Curb Leaks on Web Site, WALL STREET J., Mar. 2, 
2000, at A3. 
 82. See Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547, 565–66 (2016). 
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an ongoing contractual arrangement or at least transact at some point 
to purchase the seller’s products. Similarly, to receive commissions that 
would provide the incentive to promote, an intermediary must enter 
into a more formal contractual relationship. 
In one case, subprime credit card seller First Premier Bank sued 
CardHub, which offers a credit card comparison tool.83 First Premier—
described by Consumer Reports as offering “America’s Worst Credit 
Card”84—did not dispute CardHub’s ability to provide information 
about its credit cards.85 However, CardHub used a link, “Apply Now,” 
that directed consumers to an application at First Premier’s website 
that the company reserved for authorized partners.86 First Premier 
argued that this use of the link implied that CardHub was affiliated 
with First Premier in a way it was not—as if the consumer were 
applying for the credit card through CardHub, or as if CardHub were 
an authorized agent.87 Stated otherwise, First Premier accused 
CardHub of holding itself out to be a marketplace or promoter when 
the two companies had no such legal relationship. Thus, the distinction 
between neutral and promoter—and between marketplace and 
informer—is valuable for considering the legal and policy implications 
of digital intermediaries. 
3. Public Versus Private.  Digital intermediaries may be public or 
private. The private versus public distinction refers to the ownership 
and ongoing management of the intermediary, not the source of the 
data. For example, public initiatives have given consumers access to 
digital information about their personal home energy usage.88 Private 
companies have used this public data to create energy-saving products 
such as an “ambient orb” that changes colors throughout the day and 
flashes red when electricity prices peak, thereby enabling people to 
 
 83. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Preliminary-Injunction Motion at 2, First Premier Bank v. Papadimitriou, 2015 WL 127845 
(D.S.D. Jan. 7, 2015) (Civ. No. 14−4055). 
 84. America’s Worst Credit Card, CONSUMER REP., Nov. 2010, at 14, 14.  
 85. See First Premier Bank v. Papadimitriou, 2015 WL 127845, at *4 (D.S.D. Jan. 7, 2015). 
 86. See id. at *3. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See Aneesh Chopra, Modeling a Green Energy Challenge After a Blue Button, WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 4:55 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/09/15/modeling-
green-energy-challenge-after-blue-button [https://perma.cc/Q8D7-LKPQ]; Matt Nauman, PUC 
Approves PG&E’s SmartMeter Program, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 12, 2009, 8:06 AM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/green/ci_11897831 [https://perma.cc/Q2DR-CU66]. 
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save money on electricity.89 Although enabled by public actions, these 
companies are private intermediaries. 
Hybrid arrangements have also emerged. Public–private 
partnerships have created intermediaries in select industries such as the 
education and health sectors. Federal agencies have coordinated with 
private sector lenders and schools to provide an array of digital tools. 
These tools assist students in financing their education and adopting 
learning goals tailored to their educational history and aspirations.90 
Many public health-insurance exchanges operate through public–
private partnerships because the government relies on private 
contractors on an ongoing basis.91 Despite some hybrids, the vast 
majority of intermediaries are run by either private or public entities. 
The next two Parts explore limits of each. 
II.  WHY PRIVATE INTERMEDIARIES FALL SHORT 
Despite great enthusiasm among scholars and policymakers, 
digital intermediaries face challenges in regulating markets. Initially, it 
is difficult for a company to get started due to informational and legal 
barriers. Even if digital intermediaries fully launch, consumers and 
markets may benefit less than assumed. 
A. Start-Up Barriers 
The literature fails to sufficiently acknowledge two key challenges 
to digital intermediaries’ ascension. First, digital intermediaries often 
cannot compete in the first place because information is difficult to 
acquire or established companies use laws to repel them. Second, 
machine-readable mandatory disclosures can require substantial 
government involvement.92 
 Barriers to entry arise from the difficulty in obtaining key data. 
This is true for both of the main types of information that digital 
intermediaries seek: general product information and consumer-
specific usage information. For a cell phone plan, general information 
would include the base monthly price, amount of data allowed in 
 
 89. See Clive Thompson, Desktop Orb Could Reform Energy Hogs, WIRED MAG. (July 24, 
2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/15-08/st_thompson [https://
perma.cc/G8MV-L97C]. 
 90. See Education Data and Tools, DATA.GOV, https://www.data.gov/education/education-
apps [https://perma.cc/B8VZ-3TQ8]. 
 91. See infra Part III.A. 
 92. See supra Part I.B.  
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different plans, and rules for fees. Consumer-specific usage 
information would include a particular consumer’s history of fees paid 
or the average amount of data downloaded.93 
Customer-specific information is crucial in many markets, but 
because it is not publicly available companies can easily block 
intermediaries from accessing it. Digital intermediaries such as 
NerdWallet operate by first obtaining consumers’ permission and 
password information for online financial accounts. They then send an 
information-collecting bot into consumers’ bank and credit card 
accounts, with the goal of using that information to advise consumers 
about which financial products best serve their particular needs.94 But 
somewhat recently, after millions of consumers had provided such 
access, Bank of America and other financial institutions tried to 
completely block these bots.95 Because this blocking angered 
customers, financial institutions ultimately decided to limit what 
information the bots can access.96 Other industries have erected similar 
barriers. Airlines have blocked third-party aggregator sites’ attempts 
to let passengers see all of their frequent-flier-mile balances in one 
place.97 
It is less well understood that digital intermediaries may face 
difficulties collecting even general product information. In-store data 
is costly to collect. Amazon at one point offered to pay shoppers up to 
five dollars per item for passing on price information from brick-and-
mortar stores.98 Sellers have steadfastly blocked online intermediaries’ 
efforts to set up pharmaceutical price-comparison websites.99 
Enterprise and Avis similarly blocked a popular website, Autoslash, 
from monitoring prices to advise consumers when to rent, a service that 
reportedly saved shoppers on average 25 percent.100 
 
 93. Oren Bar-Gill emphasizes this distinction for disclosures. See Bar-Gill, supra note 47, at 
82. 
 94. See, e.g., Cracking the Vault; Retail Banking, ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 2015, at 66–67. 
 95. See Huang & Rudegeair, supra note 58. 
 96. See, e.g., Bryan Yurcan, Warning to Banking Industry: Innovate or Die, FIN. BRAND (July 
6, 2015), https://thefinancialbrand.com/52725/banking-innovation-imperative [https://perma.cc/
6VHQ-GUZA]. 
 97. See Ron Lieber, Swatting Down Start-Ups that Help Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 
2012, at B1. 
 98. See Richard Russo, Amazon’s Jungle Logic, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at A35. 
 99. See Katie Thomas, New Online Tools Offer Path to Lower Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
10, 2016, at B1. 
 100. See Ron Lieber, A Rate Sleuth Making Rental Car Companies Squirm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
18, 2012, at B1. 
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Part of the problem is that bots often cannot legally obtain the 
information they would like to aggregate and analyze, even if that 
information seems freely available on the web. For online data, sellers 
have used the law to prevent web scraping, by which intermediaries use 
web crawlers or spiders to gather online information.101 Sellers have 
successfully challenged web scraping as a violation of contract law, the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, and electronic trespass to chattel.102 For example, eBay’s 
commanding market position in online auctions, with over 90 percent 
of the market, was cemented by blocking would-be competitors, such 
as Bidder’s Edge, from collecting data.103 
Industry-specific protectionist laws, including in the automobile 
and real estate industry, also block digital intermediaries’ access to 
marketplaces and information. When an entrepreneur attempted to 
create the Amazon of the new car market, and thereby enable 
consumers to purchase cars online directly from manufacturers,104 his 
effort was blocked by laws in all fifty states that grant monopolies to 
local auto dealers.105 These laws are estimated to cost consumers about 
$40 billion each year.106 Relatedly, state-law-empowered commissions 
have historically limited price competition among real estate 
 
 101. See Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE 
J.L. & TECH. 201, 213–14 (2006).  
 102. See James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 24 
(2007); Hirschey, supra note 32, at 899, 918.  
 103. See Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. Merexchange and Why: An Analysis 
of the Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677, 706 (2015); David S. Shevitz, 
Does Current Antitrust Regulation Provide Free Parking for eBay and Paypal in the Monopoly 
Game of Online Auction Sites and Person-to-Person Online Payment Systems?, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. 
L. REV. 175, 211–12 (2009). 
 104. See Sonari Glinton, Why Buying a Car Never Changes, NPR: PLANET MONEY (Feb.  
19, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=172402376 
[https://perma.cc/V3XE-XSZY]. 
 105. Consumers cannot buy directly from Ford, and must instead buy at the local auto dealer. 
See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Tesla and the Car Dealers’ Lobby, REGULATION, Summer 2014, at 10, 
12. 
 106. See GERALD R. BODISCH, ECON. ANALYSIS GRP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST 
DIV., ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE BANS ON DIRECT MANUFACTURER SALES TO  
CAR BUYERS 4 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009/05/28/246374.
pdf [https://perma.cc/E3AH-SX8Z] (estimating automobile price increases due to territorial 
monopolies at 8.6 percent). The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates automobile spending 
at $455 to $478 billion in 2016. See National Data, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm [https://perma.cc/ZY4C-NCJP] (click on 
“Begin using the data . . .” button; then scroll to and click on tbl. 2.3.5). 8.6 percent of $460 billion 
is $40 billion. 
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brokers.107 For example, some states prohibit brokers from unbundling 
their services and only charging for listing the home (rather than the 
whole slate of broker services).108 In states such as New Jersey without 
those restrictive laws, real estate listing websites have thrived, cutting 
the commission rate by several percentage points.109 These cuts save 
consumers over seven thousand dollars on the median home.110 
Businesses have also used contract law to limit information flow, 
such as “gag clauses” or “non-disparagement clauses.” When one 
customer wrote a negative review at RipoffReport after not receiving 
a few trinkets she ordered, the retailer Kleargear billed her $3500 for 
violating a clause stating “your acceptance of this sales contract 
prohibits you from taking any action that negatively impacts [our 
company], its reputation, products, services, management or 
employees.”111 These clauses became so widespread that Congress 
ultimately passed a bill outlawing them.112 
The second major obstacle to digital intermediaries obtaining 
information is that it is more difficult than commonly assumed for 
agencies to design machine-readable mandated disclosures. No 
regulator wants to mandate unnecessary disclosures. Yet it may be 
hard to know what information digital intermediaries and sellers have. 
When markets do provide substitutes for mandated disclosures, it may 
happen subtly, through diverse firms that individually safeguard 
knowledge but collectively contribute that knowledge to, for example, 
informed prices for publicly traded shares.113 Moreover, markets will 
often only provide partial information relevant for policymakers’ 
 
 107. See Complaint at 5−6, United States v. Ky. Real Estate Comm’n, No. 3:05-cv-00188-S, 
2005 WL 1978692 (W.D. Ky. July 15, 2005); Eskridge, supra note 76, at 1148.  
 108. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Jonathan Meer, Do Real Estate Brokers Add Value When 
Listing Services Are Unbundled?, 51 ECON. INQUIRY 1166, 1167 (2013). 
 109. See Pui-Wing Tam, The Best Way To . . . Buy a House, WALL STREET J., Nov. 18, 2002, 
at R4 (reporting on the reduction of commission from 6 percent to 2 percent). 
 110. See Rebates Make Buying a Home Less Expensive, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July  
2, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/atr/rebates-make-buying-home-less-expensive [https://perma.cc/
XX7Q-RK7A] (“A 1% rebate on the median-priced home would save the homebuyer $1,843.”). 
 111. See Mary Beth Quirk, Customer Writes Negative Review After Never Receiving  
Order, Site Fines Her $3.5K, CONSUMERIST (Nov. 14, 2013), https://consumerist.com/2013/11/14/
customer-writes-negative-review-after-never-receiving-order-site-fines-her-3-5k [https://perma.
cc/B22T-Z4HX]. 
 112. Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-258, 130 Stat. 1355 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 45b, 58).  
 113. See Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Yu-Ting Forester Wong, Mandatory 
Disclosure and Individual Investors: Evidence from the JOBS Act, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 293, 327 
(2015).  
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goals. Online product reviews such as those on Amazon, TripAdvisor, 
and Yelp may miss less salient attributes such as unfavorable contract 
clauses.114 Further complicating this is that data collected by all parties 
evolves. Consequently, an agency would need to stay up-to-date on the 
latest information and perhaps rewrite specific disclosure requirements 
regularly.115 Many relevant agencies, such as the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), do not have monitoring programs to collect firms’ 
internal information for such purposes.116 Even if they did, collecting 
and analyzing the data would be resource intensive. 
Policymakers rarely undertake such complex inquiries and 
analyses in designing mandated disclosures.117 More commonly, they 
assume either that the information is readily available or that simple 
machine-readable disclosures will suffice. Underestimating the 
difficulty of setting digital intermediaries up for success thereby 
constitutes a policy obstacle. One congressman recently asked in 
exasperation, “Why isn’t it possible . . . to just have a price where 
anybody who wants to know what that price is can go to a website and 
see?”118 The counterintuitive answer in the information age is that laws 
and entrenched companies get in the way.119 
B. Misperception and Deception 
Digital intermediaries are seen as protecting consumers from end 
sellers. However, digital intermediaries sell something: use of their 
algorithms. These products raise concerns analogous to those 
demonstrated for cell phone plans, credit cards, mortgages, and other 
products. 
1. Misperception.  Firms can leverage complexity to decrease 
efficiency and raise prices. Manufacturers price printers low and ink 
cartridges high. This practice can make it more difficult for consumers 
to compare the full costs of owning the printer.120 Scholars have found 
that “misperceptions” of wireless carriers’ strategically complex 
 
 114. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More Than You Wanted to Know About the 
Failures of Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63, 71 (2015). 
 115. Alternatives, such as broader disclosure rules, are possible but raise challenges of their 
own.  
 116. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 1381. 
 117. See, e.g., Honigsberg et al., supra note 113, at 296. 
 118. Thomas, supra note 99 (quoting Representative Peter Welch).  
 119. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 1330.  
 120. Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 8, at 506–07. 
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pricing packages help explain why many subscribers wind up paying 20 
percent more than they would if they had selected the optimal plan.121 
Thus, sellers in a variety of industries use complexity and “shrouded 
attributes”122 such as expensive ink to raise prices. 
Digital intermediaries at first appear straightforward. The user 
enters basic information and receives a list. However, printers and ink, 
and to some extent cell phone plans and credit cards, also appear 
straightforward. The more important behavioral economics inquiry is 
whether decisionmaking is sufficiently complex that digital 
intermediaries are “hiding the true costs of the product from the 
imperfectly rational consumer.”123 One driver of such complexity can 
be the multidimensional nature of the price and product.124 
Many digital intermediaries’ services involve complexity and 
multidimensionality. A seminal study of online decisionmaking found 
that delivery fees, minor product distinctions, and information 
overload from online searches enable sellers to inflate prices for even 
what seem like straightforward items, such as computer accessories.125 
Instacart and Postmates, which deliver products from brick-and-
mortar retailers, list prices for each item on their website under the 
corresponding store, such as Whole Foods or CVS. Consumers would 
understandably assume that these are the brick-and-mortar stores’ 
prices and that Instacart and Postmates earn money from the delivery 
fee. However, those digital marketplaces’ prices have included an 
undisclosed and varying markup over the price that the intermediary 
pays. A recent report found that the extent of the hidden markup varies 
greatly and tends to be substantial, ranging from 22 percent on Costco 
dental floss to 120 percent on a rock-climbing carabiner from a local 
sporting goods store.126 A consumer wanting to calculate the per-use 
price of a digital marketplace’s services would need to consider these 
markups along with delivery fees, membership fees, and manufacturing 
fees.127 
 
 121. Bar-Gill & Stone, supra note 9, at 453. 
 122. Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 8, at 505. 
 123. BAR-GILL, supra note 28, at 18. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Ellison & Ellison, supra note 10, at 427. 
 126. See Brian X. Chen, The High Price of Delivery App Convenience, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2015, at B9. Markups also vary significantly among items from the same store. See id. 
 127. Yan Deng, A Look at Instacart’s Pricing as Delivery and Membership Fees Evolve, 
PROFITERO BLOG, Feb. 16, 2016, https://www.profitero.com/2016/02/a-look-at-instacarts-pricing-
as-delivery-and-membership-fees-evolve [https://perma.cc/7TSN-5ECE]. 
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Basic complexity enables digital intermediaries to leverage subtle 
psychological influences on consumers’ perceptions. Sites can anchor a 
consumer’s price perception by placing a high-priced item at the top of 
search results. This has the psychological effect of causing consumers 
to perceive subsequent items as more affordable than they would had 
they not seen a high-priced item first.128 More generally, given the 
complexity of most digital intermediaries and the subtle ways they can 
alter advice, comparing different digital intermediaries would—like 
comparing credit card offers with teaser rates and rewards programs—
require analyzing many variables. Digital intermediaries thus have 
shrouded attributes that—like shifting costs to ink cartridges or 
offering complex cell phone pricing packages—may enable companies 
to increase equilibrium prices and inefficiencies.129 
Arguably, it is even more difficult for consumers to know how 
digital intermediaries are manipulating them than in traditional 
decisionmaking contexts. Few consumers read contracts—let alone 
understand the legal terms—but they have access to them.130 
Consumers could study credit card fees in the fine print or build a 
spreadsheet to analyze complex cell phone pricing plans or printer 
costs. Indeed, many consumers do choose the optimal cell phone 
plan.131 Alternatively, consumers can rely on third parties, such as 
Consumer Reports, to conduct those analyses. In contrast, digital 
intermediaries guard their algorithms just as Coca-Cola guards its 
beverage formula.132 Besides undermining optimal consumer choice 
among digital intermediaries, this secrecy clouds the debate about how 
algorithms may contribute to economic and racial inequality.133 
 
 128. See KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP. & CONSUMERS UNION, CHOICE ARCHITECTURE: 
DESIGN DECISIONS THAT AFFECT CONSUMERS’ HEALTH PLAN CHOICES 3 (2012), http://
www.consumersunion.org/pdf/Choice_Architecture_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A3F-G52L]. 
 129. See BAR-GILL, supra note 28, at 17–20; Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 8, at 505. 
 130. See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 48, at 546–48 (reviewing the literature finding 
that few people read contracts).  
 131. See Bar-Gill & Stone, supra note 9, at 453. 
 132. See Pasquale, supra note 23, at 106. 
 133. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 18 (2015) (arguing that automated algorithms have 
discriminatory implications); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795203 [https://perma.cc/Q66F-
DYTQ] (“[A]lgorithms trained or operated on a world pervaded by discriminatory effects are 
likely to reproduce that discrimination.”); Van Loo, supra note 82, at 579–80 (concluding that 
companies’ dispute-resolution algorithms may provide unequal redress while reducing human 
bias). 
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Theory would predict that these practices ultimately raise prices 
and add inefficiency, as they do for other products.134 Empirical data 
provides some support for that conclusion. Most directly, one study 
found eBay’s algorithmic changes made a 5 to 15 percent difference in 
prices paid for many searches.135 The actual numbers are in flux as 
markets shift and digital intermediaries run tests year-round to identify 
which algorithms earn higher profits.136 
2. Deception.  A potential source of deception relates to 
undisclosed bias. Economists have shown how human financial 
advisers successfully recommend higher-priced products when 
consumers are unaware of a financial conflict of interest.137 Consumers 
also pay significantly more if a mortgage broker’s commission is part 
of the loan—which makes it far less salient—than if they pay the broker 
separately.138 
Digital intermediaries have recreated the financial industry’s 
commission structure. Most sites receive pay for each click or purchase 
following the click.139 Some products pay more commission than 
 
 134. See generally BAR-GILL, supra note 28 (discussing behavioral economic effects in 
contracts). 
 135. See Michael Dinerstein, Liran Einav, Jonathan Levin & Neel Sundaresan, Consumer 
Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20415, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20415.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H
TH-RBEM]. The eBay changes reduced prices paid. See id. Subtle changes to algorithms can 
more broadly benefit consumers. See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search 
Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 189, 191–93 (2006). However, the eBay study 
illustrates how digital intermediaries can meaningfully alter the prices paid by providing 
consumers with a different set of search results. Another study with access to firms’ internal data 
concluded that consumers searching online paid about 6 to 9 percent above the competitive level 
due to sellers’ behavioral economics-related business factors. See Ellison & Ellison, supra note 
10, at 427–29. 
 136. See, e.g., Scott McCartney, The Middle Seat: The Secret Logic to Hotel Listings on Travel 
Sites, WALL STREET J., Jan. 28, 2016, at D1 (describing Expedia’s testing). 
 137. See Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, Paying for Prominence, 121 ECON. J. F368, F368 
(2011); Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, How (Not) to Pay for Advice: A Framework for 
Consumer Financial Protection, 105 J. FIN. ECON. 393, 393 (2012); Sendhil Mullainathan, Markus 
Noeth & Antoinette Schoar, The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study 18 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17929, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17929.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H6PW-KV96]. 
 138. See Susan E. Woodward & Robert E. Hall, Consumer Confusion in the Mortgage Market: 
Evidence of Less than a Perfectly Transparent and Competitive Market, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 511, 
513 (2010). 
 139. See, e.g., First Premier Bank v. Papadimitriou, Civ. No. 14−4055, 2015 WL 127845, at *1 
(D.S.D. Jan. 7, 2015). 
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others.140 Sites “recommend” higher-commission products.141 Yet they 
freely disclose neither their overall commission nor the commission 
variation among products.142 Many omit some of the lowest-priced 
products altogether. Many users are unaware of the bias underlying the 
digital intermediary advice they receive, just as many were unaware 
mortgage brokers did not have borrowers’ best interests in mind. 
A range of disclosures and other regulations govern consumer 
products such as cell phone contracts, credit cards, and mortgages.143 
Despite structural similarities, digital intermediaries remain largely 
unregulated.144 Like mortgage brokers and other human 
intermediaries, digital intermediaries make sorting through difficult 
choices easier. Many consumers are surely better off using them than 
not, given the options available. However, as regulatory instruments, it 
is problematic to expect them to reduce the same deception and 
misperception they can create. 
C. Excess Intermediation 
Empirical data about digital intermediaries’ overall market impact 
is limited. Thus, they may overall increase efficiency in specific 
markets. Nonetheless, scholars have begun to identify potentially 
anticompetitive conduct. This conduct may mean either that 
intermediaries bring fewer benefits than typically assumed, or that 
their presence overall lowers consumer welfare in some contexts. 
Digital intermediaries often obtain high market shares. Much of 
this concentration results organically, as did iTunes’s 70 percent share 
of online music.145 Acquisitions have also played a role. After 
 
 140. McCartney, supra note 136. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Dependable Sales & Serv. Inc. v. Truecar, Inc., No. 15-cv-1742 (PKC), 2016 WL 
79992, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2016); McCartney, supra note 136. Even in the highly regulated 
consumer-finance space, the online lending portal site LendingTree, in one of its hundred 
disclosures, explains only generally that the compensation it receives from lenders “may  
impact how and where products appear on [its] site (including, for example, the order in  
which they appear).” Advertising Disclosures, LENDINGTREE, https://www.lendingtree.com/ 
legal/advertising-disclosures-offers?disclosures=00031,00001,00059,00094,00101,00109,00116,001
17 [https://perma.cc/QCR2-LFU9]. 
 143. See generally CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 54 (reporting consumer-finance 
protections). 
 144. See infra Part IV.A.3.  
 145. Ed Christman, Digital Developments Could Be Tipping Point for MP3, REUTERS  
(Dec. 1, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mp-idUSN0132743320071203 [https://perma.cc/
VFA5-A5D4]. 
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purchasing its leading competitor Trulia, online real estate listing 
service Zillow reached a 63 percent share.146 Scholars have begun to 
identify issues related to such concentration among digital companies 
that are relevant—but not necessarily specific—to digital 
intermediaries.147 Some believe the consumer harms resulting from 
digital-service concentration may be “massive” even independent of 
price, though the evidence remains limited.148 Through online 
platforms, firms use artificially intelligent price-setting software that 
can facilitate collusion.149 This “sea change in commerce” may increase 
the risk of harm to consumers from supracompetitive prices.150 
Economists have also turned their attention to conduct more 
specific to digital intermediaries. In particular, many digital 
intermediaries use price-parity clauses, or “most-favored-nation 
provisions.” Amazon, for example, requires sellers to “ensure that the 
item price and total price of an item [listed] on Amazon.com are at or 
below the item price and total price at which [the seller lists] the item 
via any other online sales channel.”151 Applied to Sony, this clause 
would prohibit the manufacturer from selling its Playstation on other 
websites or on its own website for less than the price at which it lists 
the item on Amazon. Price-comparison sites have used similar clauses 
in other industries such as for hotels, airfare, and insurance.152 
Some digital marketplaces can insist on price parity clauses 
because of their ability to exclude sellers from large portions of the 
 
 146. See Palbir Nijjar, Zillow Group, Inc. Impresses a Year After the Trulia Acquisition, 
MOTLEY FOOL (May 12, 2016, 1:13PM), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/05/12/zillow-
group-inc-impresses-a-year-after-the-trulia.aspx [https://perma.cc/5JCZ-HD5F]. 
 147. The businesses studied tend to overlap with digital intermediaries even if they often 
include sellers and other online companies, such as social media platforms.  
 148. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
149, 153, 192–93 (2015). 
 149. See Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When 
Computers Inhibit Competition 14–16 (Univ. of Tenn. Knoxville Coll. Of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 267, 2015), https://ssrn.com/ abstract=2591874 
[https://perma.cc/4D2S-S7NN]. 
 150. See Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 
100 MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1327–28 (2016). 
 151. See Selling at Amazon.com: Fees and Pricing, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/
help/customer/display.html?nodeId=1161240 [https://perma.cc/8WSL-G9UY]. 
 152. See, e.g., Ruth Bender & Tom Fairless, Booking.com to Soften Price Parity Clause  
in Hotel Contracts, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 15, 2014, 8:52 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/booking-com-to-soften-price-parity-clause-in-hotel-contracts-1418651553 [https://perma.
cc/A556-AHAW]; Press Release, U.K. Competition & Markets Authority, CMA Sets Out 
Changes for Private Motor Insurance (June 12, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-
sets-out-changes-for-private-motor-insurance [https://perma.cc/H6AX-36EG]. 
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market. This influence holds even over powerful end sellers, such as 
the top four airlines that operate 75 percent of flights.153 When only two 
of the leading travel marketplaces, Expedia and Orbitz, delisted 
American Airlines for refusing to pay their commissions, the airline 
lost the equivalent of over $100 million annually and quickly caved.154 
Courts have historically viewed price-parity clauses as improving 
competition and efficiency.155 Clauses might increase efficiency by 
reducing the costs of ongoing bargaining. Also, digital intermediaries 
such as hotel websites might be more willing to invest in promoting 
small, independent hotels if those hotels agree not to sell at lower 
prices on their own websites.156 
More recently, however, many have come to believe that such 
clauses may harm consumers. Building off the work of 2014 Nobel 
Prize–winner Jean Tirole, regulators and economists have found that 
digital intermediaries can use their market power to raise consumer 
prices to an anticompetitive level.157 For example, for a $500 airline 
ticket, about $75 to $100 go to companies such as Expedia as 
commission.158 If Expedia set that price in a hypothetical market 
without price-restraint clauses, the consumer might have the option of 
deciding whether saving $100 is worth going to airline websites directly 
to look at prices. Because some consumers would presumably go to the 
airline website to save money, the existence of that option could 
theoretically put competitive pressure on Expedia to lower its 
commission on all flights. Price-restraint clauses remove that consumer 
 
 153. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Changing Old Antitrust Thinking for a New Gilded Age, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK, July 23, 2014, at B5. 
 154. See Volodymyr Bilotkach, Nicholas Rupp & Vivek Pai, Value of a Platform to a Seller: 
Case of American Airlines and Online Travel Agencies 19 (Apr. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/events/internet/documents/Bilot
kachPaiRupp_April11_2014-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8JK-J7MK]. Courts allow intermediaries 
to remove sellers from their search engines. See Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-
02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4–5 (W.D. Okla. 2003). 
 155. See Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 
F.2d 1101, 1112 (1st Cir. 1989); Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal 
Consequences: Competitive Effects of “Most-Favored-Customer” Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 
531 (1996). 
 156. See Bender & Fairless, supra note 152. 
 157. See, e.g., Edelman & Wright, supra note 24, at 1283; Steven C. Salop & Carl Shapiro, 
Jean Tirole’s Nobel Prize in Economics: The Rigorous Foundations of Post-Chicago Antitrust 
Economics, 29 ANTITRUST 76, 80 (2015); U.K. Competition & Markets Authority, supra note 152. 
 158. This assessment is based on a 15 to 20 percent commission. See Scott Mayerowitz, Hotels 
Woo Guests to Book Directly Online with Discounts, SALON (Apr. 18, 2016 9:31AM), http://
www.salon.com/2016/04/18/hotels_woo_guests_to_book_directly_online_with_discounts [https://
perma.cc/7QQE-8NG2]. 
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choice of going straight to the airline’s website to save money because 
the price is the same whether the consumer buys from Expedia or 
United.159 Price-restraint clauses thus can promote excess use of digital 
intermediaries, thereby increasing inefficiency and raising equilibrium 
market prices.160 
Price-parity clauses can also harm consumers by limiting 
horizontal competition and new entrants. A start-up digital 
intermediary wanting to compete may not be able to use a more 
efficient business model to reduce commissions and thereby attract 
more consumers through lower prices.161 Price-parity clauses could 
impede such an entry strategy because the seller would need to give 
any discount negotiated by the start-up to established intermediaries 
as well.162 
*   *   * 
Overall, private digital intermediaries can fall short of 
expectations. They may lack the information they need to enhance 
decisionmaking. Even when they have the necessary information, they 
can add a new layer of exploitation by inserting shrouded fees or 
raising prices. Although one perceived benefit of intermediaries is the 
avoidance of choice-limiting governmental regulation, digital 
intermediaries may restrain seller autonomy. Like markets heavily 
influenced by financial intermediaries,163 markets heavily dependent 
on digital intermediaries can have lower efficiency and consumer 
welfare. 
III.  THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC INTERMEDIARIES 
Public digital intermediaries, like their private counterparts, are 
proliferating. Some assist in daily activities, such as the USDA’s 
“SuperTracker,” which tallies nutrition and exercise.164 Others guide 
people through life-altering decisions. For example, the Department of 
 
 159. Some sites may, however, offer nonprice incentives to buy directly. 
 160. See Edelman & Wright, supra note 24, at 1292. 
 161. Cf. C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1209 (2013) 
(discussing how most-favored-nation provisions in contracts can be used to exclude new 
distributors). 
 162. See id. (discussing the effect of multiple buyers having most-favored-nation provisions 
with a seller). 
 163. See Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 624–26 (2015). 
 164. See SuperTracker, supra note 2. 
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Education has a College Navigator site where prospective students can 
learn what previous students with similar characteristics paid to attend 
a particular school and what their job prospects were afterward.165 
Also, state and federal online tools enable people to assess products 
for physical safety, financial soundness, environmental health, and (in 
the case of cell phones or the internet) communications-network 
quality.166 Finally, many federal agencies let consumers learn from 
others’ bad experiences through searchable complaint data for most 
industries, including airline travel, bank accounts, and automobiles.167 
Public digital intermediaries are a large and growing part of regulation 
by digital intermediation. 
This Part examines two examples in greater depth: one 
marketplace and one informer. First, the ACA created online 
exchanges for purchasing health-insurance plans—in other words, a 
marketplace. Second, the CFPB offers a Rate Checker to inform 
people about how to choose a mortgage. Each of these intermediaries 
is structurally considered for consumer decision improvement and 
cost-effectiveness. Although public digital intermediaries are 
idiosyncratic and rigorous empirical evidence about their operation is 
limited, these two cases illustrate some broad themes for each type. 
A. Health-Insurance Exchanges 
The ACA established heavily regulated online health-insurance 
marketplaces.168 These websites list private companies’ insurance plans 
to facilitate comparison and enrollment. Some states, such as 
Massachusetts, already ran exchanges, but most did not.169 The ACA 
 
 165. See Education Data and Tools, supra note 90. 
 166. See Matthew McFeeley, Falling Through the Cracks: Public Information and the 
Patchwork of Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Laws, 38 VT. L. REV. 849, 866 (2014); CONSUMER 
PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, https://www.data.gov/safety [https://perma.cc/A64J-LT7C]; Search FCC 
Databases, FED. COMMC’N. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/licensing-databases/general/search-
fcc-databases [https://perma.cc/48G5-GC9S]. 
 167. See Consumer Complaint Database, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.
consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase [https://perma.cc/MM89-9UTM]; File a Consumer 
Complaint, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/airconsumer/file-consumer-
complaint [https://perma.cc/45D7-5PMY]. 
 168. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1311, 10104(e)-(h), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119, 173, 900, 927 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031). 
 169. See Amanda Kowalski, The Early Impact of the Affordable Care Act, State by State, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2014, at 277–78. 
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also required states to establish human navigators to advise people 
about coverage options and how to enroll.170 
Distinct from the issue of the ACA’s larger substantive success or 
failure, there is a question of how well governmentally controlled 
health-insurance intermediaries perform. Isolating the digital-
marketplace dimension of the ACA is difficult. In particular, it is hard 
to determine how much of any success or failure is attributable to the 
substantive legislation—such as the individual mandate, subsidies, and 
restrictions on insurance company margins—rather than to the actual 
design and implementation of the exchanges. Nor is it possible to know 
precisely how a privately owned health-insurance marketplace would 
have performed instead.171 
1. Consumer Decisionmaking.  To assess the health exchanges’ 
impact on consumer decisionmaking, several indicators are relevant: 
the number of people and insurers using the exchanges, the prices and 
quality of the plans purchased, the choice architecture of the interface, 
and the institutional incentives of the exchange operators. For the 
exchanges to have a meaningful impact, people must use them. About 
12 million people had insurance in 2016 due to transactions on the 
ACA exchanges.172  
As for plan quality, there is little evidence that purchasing through 
public exchanges matters. Enrollees had equal or higher satisfaction 
with their exchange-purchased insurance plans compared to those who 
purchased through private markets.173 As for prices, an early analysis 
suggested that premiums for comparable insurance plans on the 
 
 170. To further complicate the matter, the federal government has at times relied on private 
contractors to help build and operate the exchanges. See KAREN POLLITZ, JENNIFER TOLBERT 
& ROSA MA, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SURVEY OF HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE 
ASSISTER PROGRAMS: A FIRST LOOK AT CONSUMER ASSISTANCE UNDER THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT 1 (2014), http://www.statecoverage.org/files/KFF_Survey-of-marketplace-assisters1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4VQ9-VFJ3]. 
 171. See U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF. INSPECTOR GEN., CMS DID NOT 
IDENTIFY ALL FEDERAL MARKETPLACE CONTRACT COSTS AND DID NOT PROPERLY 
VALIDATE THE AMOUNT TO WITHHOLD FOR DEFECT RESOLUTION ON THE PRINCIPAL 
FEDERAL MARKETPLACE CONTRACT 3 (2015), https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region3/31403002.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8K36-V7W2]. 
 172. See Robert Pear, Health Care Law Sign-Ups Dip Amid Uncertainty and Attacks by 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2017, at A9. 
 173. See Press Release, J.D. Power, Health Insurance Marketplace Exchange Enrollment 
Satisfaction Improves Significantly in Second Year (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.jdpower.com/
press-releases/2015-health-insurance-marketplace-exchange-shopper-and-re-enrollment-hix-
study#sthash.KwUwuOP5.dpuf [https://perma.cc/H73C-QD4Y]. 
VAN LOO IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2017  3:08 PM 
2017] RISE OF THE DIGITAL REGULATOR 1299 
exchange were lower than they were in private markets; in one analysis, 
plans on the exchange were 7 percent lower for small-business 
employees.174 Even if accurate, such lower prices are likely 
unsustainable. Several sizable health insurers, including United 
Health, decided to leave many ACA exchanges in the 2016–2017 
enrollment period due to large losses.175 By one estimate, United 
Health’s complete exit alone would raise overall prices by 5 percent.176 
Thus, prices could increase considerably in the short term, and it is too 
early to draw strong conclusions based on past data. 
Institutional design factors indicate that the exchanges may lead 
to lower prices and better plan choices. Private health markets largely 
rely on insurance agents to sell plans for insurance companies.177 Agent 
commissions amount to between 4 and 6 percent of annual premiums 
paid, and as high as 30 percent of the first year’s premium.178 Insurance 
agents are not allowed to sell on the insurance exchanges—only the 
insurance companies can.179 As neutrals, the ACA navigators may thus 
remove not only a costly intermediary but also a source of consumer 
deception and misperception. Because exchange operators do not 
receive different levels of commissions from different insurers, they 
lack the incentive to steer consumers toward high-commission plans 
that are less beneficial to the consumers.180 Exchanges may lower prices 
 
 174. See Jon R. Gabel et al., An Early Look at SHOP Marketplaces: Low Premiums, Adequate 
Plan Choice in Many, But Not All, States, 34 HEALTH AFF. 732, 732 (2015) (“Premiums for plans 
offered through SHOP Marketplaces were, on average, 7 percent less than those in the same 
metal tier offered only outside of the Marketplaces.”); see also LAURA SKOPEC & RICHARD 
KRONICK, U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MARKET COMPETITION WORKS: SILVER 
PREMIUMS IN THE 2014 INDIVIDUAL MARKET ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER THAN EXPECTED 
1−2 (2013), http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2013/MarketCompetitionPremiums/ib_premiums_
update.cfm [https://perma.cc/32KL-LZ5K] (finding premiums for “Silver Plans” to be lower than 
expected). 
 175. See Anna Wilde Mathews & Stephanie Armour, Health-Plan Choices Shrink, WALL 
STREET J., Aug. 29, 2016, at A1. 
 176. See Leemore Dafny, Jonathan Gruber & Christopher Ody, More Insurers Lower 
Premiums: Evidence from Initial Pricing in the Health Insurance Marketplaces, AM. J. HEALTH 
ECON., Winter 2015, at 53, 53–54.  
 177. See POLLITZ et al., supra note 170, at 23. 
 178. See Mark Schoofs & Avery Johnson, Health Overhaul Hits Sales Commissions, WALL 
STREET J., May 18, 2010, at B1. 
 179. Insurers can still pay agents to promote the exchanges. See FAMILIES USA, BROKERS 
AND AGENTS AND HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 3, 7, 9 (2012), http://familiesusa.org/sites/
default/files/product_documents/Exchanges-Brokers-and-Agents.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7HG-
UUQ7]. 
 180. See id. at 4. 
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partly by filtering out plans believed to benefit patients less.181 This 
removes some choice, but less complex choices can also reduce 
equilibrium prices.182 
The question remains whether a private neutral health exchange, 
akin to the eBay model,183 would work better than a public one. Like a 
private marketplace, public health-exchange operators have incentives 
to increase transactions. After all, enrollment is a publicly salient 
measure of success. Also, the exchanges’ administration is funded 
through a surcharge on the sales.184 Thus, the pursuit of funding and 
reputation could drive the exchange’s governmental directors to design 
the exchanges to encourage purchases without regard to enrollees’ 
interests. Legal scholars have identified such skewed administrative 
agency incentives elsewhere.185 This bureaucratic self-interest could 
encourage overconsumption of the exchanges’ services, just as private 
travel websites do with their price-comparison services or more neutral 
marketplaces such as eBay might do with respect to overall purchases. 
Although such skewed incentives are possible, public and private 
marketplaces theoretically differ in at least two important respects. 
First, whereas with a private marketplace the total revenues are 
important to investors and constantly reported in the media, with a 
public marketplace the more important aggregate metrics highlighted 
are the millions of people enrolled. This means that public 
marketplaces have less, if any, incentive to encourage users to pay high 
prices than their private counterparts. Second, private marketplaces 
have an institutional incentive to lower prices only when consumers 
would notice, which is often not the case.186 Public marketplaces, in 
contrast, have an institutional incentive to lower prices even when the 
individuals would not notice, as doing so demonstrates societal value 
to a broader set of stakeholders such as taxpayers and policymakers. 
It would be ideal to know what can be expected as the ACA 
marketplaces mature. The Massachusetts Health Connector (MHC), 
 
 181. See Jon Kingsdale, Health Insurance Exchanges—Key Link in a Better-Value Chain, 362 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2147, 2149 (2010). 
 182. Cf. Ellison & Ellison, supra note 10, at 427 (finding price increases due to choice 
complexity). 
 183. See supra Part I.C.2.  
 184. See Kingsdale, supra note 181, at 2147. 
 185. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 853, 854 (2014) (concluding that incentives such as reputation and agency revenue 
generation can lead regulators to pursue excessive monetary awards). 
 186. See supra Part I.A (discussing the literature on behavioral economics). 
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which has operated for longer and was a model for the ACA 
exchanges, provides some perspective. It succeeded on a number of 
fronts related to consumer welfare. It made comparison shopping easy, 
providing convenience and saving time.187 It encouraged new market 
entrants in what had previously been a market dominated by 
entrenched insurers.188 It increased transparency by requiring concrete 
disclosures and filtering out problematic plans.189 While it is difficult to 
know the overall price-competition impact of such an exchange, 
consumers on the exchange behaved differently than those purchasing 
plans elsewhere and “gravitate[d] toward the cheapest and least 
generous plans.”190 In assessing any savings from lower prices paid, 
public taxpayer costs are relevant. Also, the quality of coverage, rather 
than only price and convenience, must be considered. Although 
questions remain about the long-term effects of the ACA exchanges 
on consumer welfare, in particular on price, early results combined 
with the MHC’s long-term success suggest that sustainable consumer 
protection advances are possible. 
To be sure, decisionmaking challenges still exist in the ACA 
health exchanges. One study found that even highly educated 
participants had difficulty matching plans to their preferences in the 
ACA marketplaces.191 The amount of information was overwhelming, 
and key terms were not adequately explained.192 This context likely still 
makes it possible for sophisticated private insurance companies to 
influence enrollees’ decisions within the allowable parameters of the 
exchange. But despite these caveats and the limited empirical evidence, 
the health-insurance exchanges illustrate how public digital 
marketplaces can structurally reduce many of the factors that 
contribute to suboptimal consumer choices. 
2. Resource-Allocation Effectiveness.  Another important metric 
for public marketplaces is public managers’ ability to appropriately 
allocate resources. If intermediaries advance consumer 
 
 187. See Kingsdale, supra note 181, at 2149. 
 188. Id.  
 189. See id.  
 190. See Keith Marzilli Ericson & Amanda Starc, Heuristics and Heterogeneity in Health 
Insurance Exchanges: Evidence from the Massachusetts Connector, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 497 
(2012). 
 191. Charlene A. Wong et al., The Experience of Young Adults on HealthCare.gov: 
Suggestions for Improvement, 161 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 231, 231 (2014). 
 192. See id. 
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decisionmaking through excessive tax expenditures, the benefits would 
be illusory. Alternatively, inadequate funding could limit 
intermediaries’ success. 
The federal exchange systems cost over $400 million to build, with 
further investments needed for state sites.193 Though massive, these 
start-up costs are consistent with the investments made in large-scale 
intermediary start-ups, which can run in the billions.194 Moreover, the 
exchanges are self-funding off a percentage of sales,195 which means 
that they will need to prove themselves continually in the market by 
attracting and retaining customers. This business model provides some 
confidence that ongoing operations will not involve excessive annual 
tax expenditures. 
More importantly, public exchanges appear to serve the 
previously uninsured more cost-effectively than do private distribution 
channels. The Massachusetts predecessor exchange operated on an 
administrative budget of 3 percent of total premiums. The ACA 
reports a similar level of annual expenditures. This is significantly 
lower than conventional private sector channels’ operation costs of 5 
to 20 percent of premiums.196 
Despite managing costs well, the exchanges raise concerns about 
ongoing allocation of adequate resources because they are vulnerable 
to the political process. In the private sector, those in control of a 
company—the board and its executives—have strong incentives to 
maintain or strengthen operations. The equivalent leaders of health 
exchanges—elected officials—are less unified. This creates two main 
problems: operating constraints and funding discontinuity. 
Politics likely constrained the exchanges’ rollout and design. To 
avoid hurting their campaigns, Democrats put off proposing necessary 
rules until after elections. Republicans in Congress delayed funds.197 
Both of these moves decreased the likelihood that the exchanges would 
be fully functional by the launch date. Further rollout problems 
resulted from Republican-controlled state legislatures passing laws 
creating barriers to implementation of the federal Democrat-driven 
 
 193. Robert Pear, Sharon LaFraniere & Ian Austen, From the Start, Signs of Trouble at Health 
Portal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2013, at A1. 
 194. See, e.g., Another Digital Gold Rush; Internet Businesses, ECONOMIST, May 14, 2011 at 
85. 
 195. See Kingsdale, supra note 181, at 2147. 
 196. See id.; Abby Goodnough, In Kentucky, Abandoning Health Plan Sows Doubts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2016, at A14. 
 197. See Pear, LaFraniere & Austen, supra note 192. 
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ACA.198 For example, nineteen states passed laws allowing only 
licensed navigators to supply information about the ACA exchanges.199 
This curtailed outreach by preventing community health centers and 
others from informing consumers.200 Public digital intermediaries, like 
private ones,201 can increase inefficiencies due to protectionist laws. 
Sustainability threats likely result from the political wrangling 
between states and the federal government. For instance, the need to 
build consensus may explain the allowance of state-run exchanges 
when a single federal model would be more efficient.202 Indeed, the 
political process is built into the exchanges’ ongoing operations 
because agency directors are accountable to elected politicians. If the 
exchanges need to make strategic moves that stray from the exchanges’ 
statutory mandate, this could introduce delays that prevent 
appropriately responding to market demands. The legislative process 
can delay action for weeks or months, while markets and businesses 
can shift drastically on a daily, if not hourly, basis. 
The political process also creates discontinuity. Kentucky’s new 
health-insurance exchange, kynect, has been touted as an ACA model 
because it slashed the state’s number of uninsured in half.203 
Nonetheless, in 2016, the state’s new governor began dismantling it 
 
 198. See Richard Cauchi, State Laws and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, NAT’L 
CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (July 1, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-laws-and-
actions-challenging-ppaca.aspx [https://perma.cc/GP2X-49BL]; 2016 Governors and Legislatures, 
MULTISTATE ASSOCS. INC., https://www.multistate.com/state-resources/governors-legislatures 
[https://perma.cc/P3X2-MARN]. 
 199. See PETER SHIN et al., ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF STATE POLICIES ON 
COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS’ OUTREACH AND ENROLLMENT ACTIVITIES 3, 19 (2014), http://
go.gwu.edu/ggrchnbrief35 [https://perma.cc/BV9A-JTL6]; Kirsten Dunham, Navigating the 
Health Insurance Exchanges: Will State Regulations Guide Consumers or Chart Them Off-
Course?, 79 MO. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (2014). 
 200. See Katherine T. Vukadin, Obamacare Interrupted: Obstructive Federalism and the 
Consumer Information Blockade, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 421, 422 (2015); Kelly Kennedy,  
Study: Navigator Laws Limit Health Exchange Outreach, USA TODAY (Jan. 14, 2014,  
11:19 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/14/navigator-laws-limit-health-
outreach-efforts/4462759 [https://perma.cc/ZTM2-8EMB]. 
 201. See supra Part II. 
 202. See, e.g., Carla Anderson, The Federal Exchange Option, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG 
(Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.healthinsurance.org/obamacare/federal-exchange-option [https://
perma.cc/Z949-MMWH]. 
 203. See Amber Phillips, Kentucky, Once an Obamacare Exchange Success Story, Now  
Moves to Shut It Down, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
the-fix/wp/2016/01/14/a-republican-governors-move-to-shutter-kentuckys-obamacare-exchange-
explained [https://perma.cc/8SYB-976S]. 
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after running on a campaign slogan of ending Obamacare.204 The 
exchanges were self-funding at that point, and $136 million had gone 
into setting them up.205 Moreover, it cost an estimated $23 million to 
take the site down.206 In a state in which the ACA was politically 
unpopular, however, the shutdown made political sense. 
Overall, the health-insurance exchanges raise some concerns 
about digital marketplaces offering sustained solutions. It is possible 
an excessive focus on consumers has failed to produce a marketplace 
in which businesses will continue to participate. To the extent 
intermediaries must rely on slow-moving legislatures to adapt and 
continue operations, they are disadvantaged compared to private 
sector intermediaries capable of adjusting to rapid market shifts and 
accessing reliable funding sources. At the same time, the health-
insurance exchanges have increased access to health insurance, 
reduced consumer protection concerns, and possibly lowered prices for 
consumers. They may have done so at reasonable costs. The long-term 
equilibrium market effects of the exchanges remain unknown. Yet 
initial results indicate that, with substantial investments, public digital 
marketplaces have the potential to advance consumer welfare in ways 
that—at least in some markets—private marketplaces do not. 
B. Mortgage Rate Checker 
Businesses and governmental entities offer digital tools to help 
home buyers select mortgages.207 These tools are in some ways 
competing to attract users. During the 2016 Super Bowl, the nation’s 
third-largest mortgage lender, Quicken, announced a new “Rocket 
Mortgage” tool that lets consumers find home loans by pressing a 
button on their phone. Within minutes, the CFPB had tweeted its 
rebuke, encouraging consumers to “know” before they “owe.”208 This 
tweet presumably referred to its suite of “know before you owe” 
mortgage tools, including a Rate Checker tool that the CFPB rolled 
out in 2015. The tool provides tailored interest rates based on actual 
 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: American Dream or Illusion of 
Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REV. 573, 583 nn.46–47 (2009) (discussing the mortgage tools offered 
by the Federal Housing Administration and Freddie Mac). 
 208. See, e.g., John Niemann, Super Bowl Ad Criticized by CFPB, CFPB J. (Feb. 9, 2016), 
http://cfpbjournal.com/issue/cfpb-journal/article/super-bowl-ad-criticized-by-cfpb [https://perma.
cc/28LN-RMPN]. 
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mortgages offered to consumers across the country.209 Unlike the ACA 
exchanges, which are marketplaces, the CFPB mortgage tool is an 
informer. 
1. Consumer Decisionmaking.  One of the CFPB site’s primary 
goals is to encourage home buyers to shop for loans just as they shop 
for homes. Nearly half of home buyers go with the first mortgage quote 
they get.210 To change this, the Rate Checker gives consumers a range 
of actual mortgage interest rates that similar borrowers obtained 
nearby.211 After entering data such as credit score, location, loan 
amount, and loan duration, consumers learn how much they would 
save on interest over the first five years of the loan if they obtain the 
lowest comparable rate.212 
The CFPB’s early results demonstrate some major challenges for 
public informers. Only a tiny fraction of borrowers—well under 5 
percent—uses the tool.213 Such limited market adoption makes it less 
likely a tool will have much of an impact on consumer welfare.214 A 
larger problem is that the Rate Checker offers uncertain value even for 
those who use it. The tool provides interest rates as its output. It does 
not, however, calculate the APR, which includes closing costs, 
mortgage insurance, and miscellaneous fixed-dollar fees.215 Other 
private sector mortgage tools, including informers, analyze some of 
 
 209. See Lydia Wheeler, CFPB Creates Online Tool to Help Homebuyers with Mortgages, 
THE HILL (Sept. 17, 2015, 5:02 PM), http://thehill.com/regulation/254059-cfpb-creates-online-
tool-to-help-homebuyers-with-mortgages [https://perma.cc/9549-BJEW]. 
 210. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMERS’ MORTGAGE SHOPPING 
EXPERIENCE 10 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201501_cfpb_consumers-mortgage-
shopping-experience.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4EV-RHHW]. 
 211. See Explore Interest Rates, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumer
finance.gov/owning-a-home/check-rates [https://perma.cc/2A6J-EE6V]. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See Interview with Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Anonymous Employee (Mar. 14, 2016) 
(notes on file with the Duke Law Journal) (confirming that the number of people using the tool 
is very small); Kenneth Harney, Home Buyers Don’t Seem to Be Using New Tool to Shop  
for Mortgages, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/ 
home-buyers-dont-seem-to-be-using-new-tool-to-shop-for-mortgages/2016/01/11/f174ccbc-b87f-
11e5-99f3-184bc379b12d_story.html [https://perma.cc/85RB-GMPP] (interviewing a group of 
lenders and brokers and concluding that fewer than 5 percent of borrowers are using the CFPB’s 
mortgage tools).  
 214. For a discussion of the possibility of an informed minority improving markets, see supra 
note 42. 
 215. See Explore Interest Rates, supra note 211. 
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these fees in addition to the interest rate.216 It is thus possible that 
consumers would get a more comprehensive basis for mortgage 
comparison from other online tools. Because one of the main policy 
goals in deploying digital intermediaries is to aid people to make 
optimal decisions in the face of complexity, incomplete advice is a 
major flaw. 
Additionally, omitting these fees may enable lenders to shift more 
of the price paid to less salient aspects of the loan. If borrowers use the 
interest rate as the basis for comparison because of the CFPB tool, then 
a lender could lure such borrowers in by lowering the interest rate and 
raising the cost of more hidden fees that consumers are less able to 
compare. This shifting of fees is precisely the type of shrouded attribute 
that behavioral economics regulations, which informed the CFPB’s 
creation, aim to diminish.217 The Federal Truth in Lending Act, for 
example, requires that lenders disclose the APR prominently in their 
mortgage offers, and the CFPB is the primary federal enforcer of that 
law.218 Thus, the CFPB’s inclusion of only the interest rate is 
inconsistent with a primary aim of the disclosure rules it enforces on 
private actors. 
Another challenge is that the CFPB’s Rate Checker provides a 
more cautious perspective on the price of the loan than alternate 
private digital intermediaries. For example, an interest rate calculator 
offered by the “Mortgage Professor,” of the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, provides a “shopping price.”219 This is 
a single price that the borrower can ask the lender to match or beat. In 
contrast, the CFPB offers a range of interest rates obtained by similarly 
situated borrowers.220 Offering a range insulates the agency from 
charges that it is setting a particular price. The range also lessens the 
illusion of precision. However, it makes it more difficult for the 
borrower to know how to use that information. Should the borrower 
 
 216. See, e.g., Mortgage Annual Percentage Rate Calculator, BANKRATE, http://
www.bankrate.com/calculators/mortgages/mortgage-apr-calculator.aspx [https://perma.cc/8PMS-
DUPR]; Pricing Tool, MORTGAGE PROFESSOR, http://www.mtgprofessor.com/ext/partners/
pricingtool.aspx [https://perma.cc/YGS7-GT4R]. 
 217. See, e.g., Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 8, at 505. 
 218. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 2(3), 2(4), 
1061(b)(1)(A), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1387, 2036 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 7, 12, 15 U.S.C.) (transferring authority over the Truth in Lending Act from 
the Federal Reserve to the CFPB). 
 219. See Explore Interest Rates, supra note 210. 
 220. See id. 
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ask for the lowest rate in the range provided by the CFPB? The average 
of that range? The answer is unclear. 
Theoretically, it is possible that knowledge of the low-end rate 
would drive consumers to bargain harder. However, the CFPB has so 
far produced no such evidence. Instead, media and industry groups 
have found that the CFPB’s tool produced higher interest rates than 
those suggested through other sources.221 If this is systematically true, 
the tool would risk influencing consumers to settle for higher interest 
rates than they should. Although the tool would not intentionally lead 
consumers astray, as promoters might, it could have the same ultimate 
impact on consumer welfare. 
More broadly, this industry criticism raises concerns about the 
accuracy and utility of the Rate Checker’s data. For its mortgage 
calculator, the CFPB purchases interest rate data from the private 
sector—the same data that any private actor could purchase. As a 
result, it is likely that for-profit mortgage calculators have 
informational advantages because they purchase or collect other data 
sources that the CFPB does not. 
2. Resource-Allocation Effectiveness.  Running an effective public 
digital informer that can compete with private informers in the 
mortgage industry likely requires more resources than the CFPB has 
allocated. These resource imbalances may explain the Rate Checker’s 
minimal usage by consumers and possibly its questionable design. The 
CFPB’s total budget for providing the public with digital tools and 
databases is about $9 million.222 Yet the Rate Checker is one of many 
digital projects, including databases for consumer complaints, credit 
card agreements, financial regulations, and college tuition payments.223 
Any one initiative such as the mortgage toolkit would be hard-pressed 
to have even a million dollars put toward it annually. Private sector 
digital informers’ budgets can run in the tens of millions or hundreds 
of millions of dollars.224 
Moreover, the CFPB Rate Checker must compete not only with 
private intermediaries but also with the third-party sellers offering 
 
 221. See Rachel Witkowski, Banks to CFPB: Tear Down This Rate Calculator, AM. BANKER 
(Mar. 16, 2015, 6:14 PM) http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/banks-to-cfpb-
tear-down-this-rate-calculator-1073273-1.html [https://perma.cc/73CX-6SGP]. 
 222. See CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 54, at 89 tbl.47. 
 223. See id. at 88–89. 
 224. See, e.g., Chelsey Dulaney & Drew FitzGerald, Expedia to Buy Rental Site, WALL 
STREET J., Nov. 5, 2015, at B3. 
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online tools. For example, the nation’s third-largest mortgage lender, 
Quicken Loans, is putting $100 million into advertising alone for its 
Rocket Mortgage online tool.225 In contrast, the CFPB has no 
advertising budget for its Rate Checker.226 This resource disparity 
played out in the 2016 Super Bowl. In Quicken Loan’s $5 million ad, it 
explained that Rocket Mortgage aims to do for mortgages what “the 
Internet did for buying music and plane tickets and shoes . . . press a 
button, buy a mortgage.”227 The CFPB’s response tweet to its 54,000 
Twitter followers228 and any publicity from media and grass-roots 
organizations are not inconsequential. Still, those outlets fall short of 
the Super Bowl’s 112 million viewers.229 
From a technological and design perspective, 450 Quicken 
employees spent five years developing Rocket Mortgage.230 Only six 
people worked on the CFPB’s Rate Checker for about a year.231 
Furthermore, the CFPB must also compete directly with financial 
institutions far better resourced than Quicken Loans. The nation’s 
largest banks—JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo, each with annual 
incomes of over $20 billion232—offer mortgage calculators that could 
substitute for the CFPB’s Rate Checker.233 
Overall, the CFPB’s mortgage tool demonstrates fundamental 
challenges with public digital intermediaries. If a private digital 
informer has too few consumers using it or is ineffective at offering 
consumers what they want, it must adapt or close. Many for-profit 
 
 225. See Matt Burns, This Could Be the Mortgage Industry’s iPhone Moment, TECHCRUNCH 
(Nov. 24, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/11/24/this-could-be-the-mortgage-industrys-iphone-
moment [https://perma.cc/K5SQ-R5WD]. 
 226. See CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 54, at 88–89, Interview with Anonymous 
Employee, supra note 213. 
 227. See Niemann, supra note 208; Quicken Loans, #RocketMortgage Super Bowl Ad: What 
We Were Thinking, YOUTUBE (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QlRm6
Y5iVfw [https://perma.cc/PB8A-LTJ3]. 
 228. See @CFPB, TWITTER (Feb. 7, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://twitter.com/CFPB/status/69649
1147708002308 [https://perma.cc/A8EY-FDDG]. 
 229. See Richard Sandomir, Game Short of TV Record, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2016, at B8. 
 230. See Burns, supra note 224. 
 231. CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 54, at 88–89; Interview with Anonymous Employee, 
supra note 213. 
 232. See Wall Street’s 4th Quarter Earnings, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK  
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/13/business/dealbook/13db-wall-
street-earnings.html [https://perma.cc/TL56-H4E9]. 
 233. See Mortgage Calculators & Resources, CHASE, https://www.chase.com/mortgage/
mortgage-resources [https://perma.cc/MQ5E-GDU7]; Mortgage Rate and Payment Calculator, 
WELLS FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/mortgage/rates/calculator [https://perma.cc/GJV5-
3C6E]. 
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companies have set up online financial advisors but failed. For 
example, despite favorable press coverage, the website MoneyAisle 
folded.234 By contrast, an unused or ineffective public mortgage rate 
checker has less incentive to adapt or close. In the face of industry 
criticism of its effectiveness and calls to take the Rate Checker down 
in early 2015, the CFPB replied that it would update the tool as part of 
an “overall upgrade” later in the year.235 It is difficult to know what that 
update entailed or whether it happened, but the tool has not responded 
to the main critiques.236 Nor has the agency released data about the 
number of its users or how much the Rate Checker benefits consumers. 
C. Summary of Public Digital Intermediary Limits 
Public digital intermediaries have the advantage of being able to 
operate more neutrally with respect to consumers’ interests. This 
tendency toward neutrality may come at the expense of performance. 
Public informers have limited resources and are confined to whatever 
outcome assessments the agency running them chooses, which may be 
nothing. These limitations are especially troublesome given that public 
informers compete with well-funded private alternatives that 
continually run statistical self-assessments237 and can go bankrupt if 
they perform poorly. Public marketplaces such as the health-insurance 
exchanges solve some of these accountability and resource problems if 
they operate off a percentage of sales. However, they require large up-
front financial and legislative support and are subject to the whims of 
the political process. Additionally, industry influence over agencies 
could subtly over time make their advice less helpful to consumers.238 
The specter of capture is particularly concerning given the opaque 
nature of algorithms and the potential for people to place even greater 
trust in government tools due to the assumption of neutrality. 
These benefits and drawbacks present difficult choices. 
Consumers seeking digital advice may face a choice between a more 
trustworthy but limited public informer and an insightful but 
manipulative private informer. Alternatively, they would need to foot 
 
 234. See Emily Glazer, Refinance Auto Loan, WALL STREET J., Dec. 19, 2010. 
 235. See Witkowski, supra note 221. 
 236. See Explore Interest Rates, supra note 211. 
 237. See, e.g., McCartney, supra note 136 (describing Expedia’s testing). 
 238. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 46–47 (2010). 
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a greater tax bill for a more sophisticated public digital intermediary 
that opponents could ultimately neutralize. 
IV.  EFFECTIVE DIGITAL REGULATORS 
The shortcomings of digital intermediaries in their current 
manifestations raise the question of what reforms would be needed for 
these tools to be more likely to advance society’s interests. For 
policymakers to have confidence that private digital intermediaries are 
effectively regulating markets, agencies would need to vigorously 
pursue mandated disclosures, antitrust, and consumer protections. 
Effective publicly run digital intermediaries would require well-
funded, capture-resistant agencies committed to performance metrics 
and perhaps pushing the bounds of allowable governmental data 
collection. These analyses do not serve as proposals. Rather, they aim 
to provide a more realistic perspective on what is required to 
accomplish reformers’ typical goals for digital regulators. 
A. Effective Private Digital Regulators 
1. Holistic Mandated Disclosures.  Providing digital intermediaries 
with the information they need to help consumers optimize decisions 
would require extensive government involvement. Determining 
precisely what information to target is no small task. For many 
markets, information on both the product and its consumer-specific 
usage would be valuable.239 Requiring the release of person-specific 
data, even with a consumer’s approval, raises privacy issues that would 
need to be considered as part of a holistic disclosure regime.240 More 
broadly, given how artificial intelligence functions, identifying valuable 
data may be possible only after machines have analyzed big data sets. 
One solution to this would be to require sweeping data disclosures, but 
this could be burdensome. Alternatively, regulators could attempt to 
determine precisely what data should be released. To do this, 
regulators would need to run sophisticated big-data analyses on their 
own or understand firms’ internal analyses. 
Additionally, sellers will seek to undermine digital disclosures just 
as they have with traditional disclosure mandates.241 Likely strategies 
 
 239. See supra Part II.A. 
 240. For an analysis of privacy regulation, see generally Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre 
K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011). 
 241. See PASQUALE, supra 133, at 16.  
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include delaying the disclosures long enough to disadvantage 
intermediaries in fast-moving markets. Or businesses could change 
their internal operations so that similar data targeted by previous 
disclosures is no longer covered. Overcoming such business resistance 
would mean ongoing regulatory involvement. 
From a government-resource perspective, digital disclosures have 
the benefit of making intermediaries, rather than regulators, carry the 
burden of analyzing how to use the data to advance consumer 
decisionmaking. Regardless, in the cost-benefit analysis, it is important 
to recognize that mandated digital disclosures involve significant 
investment by both regulators and businesses.242 
2. Competition Policy.  Competition policy is essential for digital 
intermediaries to advance policy goals. Authorities would first need to 
ensure protectionist laws do not prevent digital intermediaries from 
fully functioning. Then, once digital intermediaries were established, 
authorities would need to guard against intermediaries engaging in 
anticompetitive practices. 
Copyright law, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, restrictive 
license statutes, and other laws hinder digital intermediaries’ ability to 
serve consumers.243 Possible legislative responses include amending 
each area of law to create exceptions or passing a new law explicitly 
exempting digital intermediaries from restrictions. In some cases, 
agencies might act: other countries’ regulators have issued rules 
preventing banks from refusing to provide consumers’ information to 
third parties when the consumer has given consent.244 Alternatively, 
antitrust suits could work. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has 
successfully prosecuted such cases against real estate commissions that 
used their state-granted licensing authority to ban brokers from 
competing on commission prices.245 The DOJ and FTC have also 
recognized that real estate brokers’ efforts to hinder access to multiple 
listing-service databases may violate antitrust law.246 
 
 242. See, e.g., Joanna Shepherd, Is More Information Always Better? Mandatory Disclosure 
Regulations in the Prescription Drug Market, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 1, 17 (2013). 
 243. See supra Part II.A. 
 244. See Cracking the Vault; Retail Banking, supra note 94, at 67. 
 245. See generally United States v. Ky. Real Estate Comm’n, No. 3:05-cv-00188-S, 2005 WL 
1978692 (W.D. Ky. July 15, 2005) (stipulating to a final judgment in a case involving a rebate ban).  
 246. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMPETITION IN THE REAL ESTATE 
BROKERAGE INDUSTRY 9–14, 71 (2007). 
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Once established, digital intermediaries raise concerns about 
collusion. Mandating the disclosure of price information can facilitate 
collusion among sellers if competitors use that information to 
coordinate prices.247 Disclosure-driven collusion is less likely in the 
consumer context than in business-to-business contexts in which such 
pricing data is less readily available.248 Nonetheless, attentiveness to 
this issue, and readiness to prosecute any collusion, should be part of a 
digital-disclosure regime. The possibility of algorithm-driven price-
fixing through the interplay between the algorithms used by 
intermediaries and sellers is more complicated. Even if the effect is 
collusive pricing above the competitive level, the lack of human intent 
may mean antitrust law does not cover such activity.249 
A larger competition problem is how to handle digital 
intermediaries with commanding market positions. Scholars have 
argued that “if network effects entrench a dominant arrangement and 
a more efficient alternative appears viable, regulators may have a role 
to play in facilitating movement to the more efficient alternative.”250 
Outside of the United States, competition authorities have heightened 
antitrust scrutiny of dominant platforms. Attention from European 
competition authorities caused Amazon to withdraw its price-parity 
clause from contracts in Europe.251 U.K. competition regulators issued 
a rule “ban[ning] agreements between price comparison 
websites . . . and insurers which stop insurers from making their 
 
 247. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 24 
(2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7SAR-X3TL]. 
 248. It is unclear how likely collusion would be from mandating digital disclosures for 
individual decisionmaking. Evidence of mandate-driven collusion comes mostly from more 
opaque business-to-business markets. See PER BALTZER OVERGAARD & H. PETER 
MØLLGAARD, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, MARKET TRANSPARENCY AND DYNAMIC 
OLIGOPOLY 2 (2007). In retail settings, such information is typically freely available. It is common 
practice for sellers to monitor their competitors’ prices. See Dana Mattioli, Retailers try To Thwart 
Price Apps—Programs Like RedLaser Prompt Bricks-and-Mortar Stores to Develop Exclusive 
Product Lines, WALL STREET J., Dec. 23, 2011, at B3. They have the resources and incentives to 
collect and process this information. It is only consumers—and the often budget-constrained 
intermediary start-ups—that lack the ability to collect and analyze this information. Indeed, 
because sellers today devote resources to collecting competitors’ prices, making such information 
digitally available could lower their costs and improve efficiency. 
 249. See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 149, at 7. 
 250. Judge, supra note 162, at 641.  
 251. See Amazon to Alter Pricing Policy for Traders, BBC (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.bbc.
com/news/business-23881202 [http://perma.cc/3U8C-F9W2]. 
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products available more cheaply on other online platforms.”252 In the 
United States, digital intermediaries’ price-restraint clauses have 
escaped regulatory objections.253 
Some precedent for more antitrust activity can be found in 
analogous industries. The DOJ has brought multi-billion-dollar 
antitrust lawsuits against credit card issuers such as Visa and 
MasterCard for price restraints.254 These credit card cases involve 
similar economic analyses of two-sided network markets as would 
apply to digital intermediaries.255 Still, U.S. antitrust law has yet to 
adapt to new issues presented by digital services.256 Effective digital 
regulators thus may require reform not only to antitrust laws but also 
to the agencies, such as the FTC, that enforce them.257 
3. Consumer Protection.  More consumer protection would be 
needed to ensure that digital intermediaries—especially promoters—
do not exploit consumers. Federal laws protect individuals served by 
human intermediaries, such as financial advisers, mortgage brokers, 
stock traders, and accountants.258 Fiduciary laws have even—in limited 
contexts—protected those receiving guidance from other nondigital 
 
 252. See CMA Publishes Final Motor Insurance Order, Gov.UK (Mar. 18, 2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-publishes-final-motor-insurance-order [https://perma.
cc/3U8C-F9W2]. 
 253. Private lawsuits by businesses such as American Airlines have, however, been brought. 
See Michael L. Weiner & Craig G. Falls, Counseling on MFNs After E-Books, 28 ANTITRUST 68, 
72 (2014); Heather Struck, American Airlines Renews Antitrust Battle; Down 3% After Hours, 
FORBES (June 1, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/heatherstruck/2011/06/01/
american-airlines-renews-antitrust-battle-down-3-after-hours/#4275eed6a2ad [https://perma.cc/
S5B2-SKF7].  
 254. See, e.g., Andrew Martin, Visa and Master Card Settle Antitrust Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
2010, at B1. Credit card companies had long contractually forbidden merchants from offering 
lower prices to customers for using cash. See id. In 2016, the DOJ was also involved in a class 
action against the major credit card companies for colluding to set interchange fees. See In re 
Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 207, 213, 215 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 827 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 255. See Edelman & Wright, supra note 24, at 1283, 1289; Jean Tirole, Market Failures and 
Public Policy, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1665, 1674, fig. 4 (2015) (applying a similar analysis to search 
portals and credit card companies). 
 256. See Newman, supra note 148, at 195–99. See generally Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 149 
(discussing the problems posed by artificial intelligence’s accelerated development). 
 257. Cf. Mehra, supra note 150, at 1361–74 (discussing potential changes to antitrust law to 
account for the effects that robo-sellers’ algorithmic pricing has on consumers). 
 258. See, e.g., Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) 
(2012); Loan Originator Compensation Requirements Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026 (2016); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An 
Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1303 (2003). 
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intermediaries, such as travel agents.259 In contrast, little has been done 
to regulate digital intermediaries’ unfair or deceptive conduct. 
The agency that has most actively regulated such conduct, the 
Department of Transportation (DOT), oversees one of the most 
advanced digital intermediary industries. The DOT recently issued a 
rule requiring online travel websites, such as Kayak, Expedia, and 
Travelocity, to disclose bias in price-search results.260 
The main consumer protection agencies—the FTC and CFPB—
have made it clear that intermediaries’ practices are within their 
regulatory authority. In 2015, the CFPB took steps toward regulating 
intermediaries when it began looking into Bankrate’s online mortgage-
comparison tool.261 The FTC has also investigated Yelp to see if it was 
prioritizing recommendations in accordance with advertisement 
dollars.262 These actions were presumably taken under the agencies’ 
authority to regulate unfair and deceptive acts and practices.263 
Although the CFPB and FTC have issued no rules targeted at 
digital intermediaries, the FTC has sent letters to search engines 
warning them to make it clear when results are influenced by 
advertisements.264 Yet the FTC’s efforts to influence online entities’ 
behavior through voluntary compliance have not always proved 
successful.265 This piecemeal approach leaves many questions 
unanswered. It is unclear, for example, whether intermediaries’ most 
subtle nudges—those buried in the algorithms or website design—are 
on regulators’ radars. 
 
 259. United Airlines, Inc. v. Lerner, 87 Ill. App. 3d 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
 260. See U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, supra note 1. 
 261. See Ben Lane, CFPB Launches Investigation into Bankrate Mortgage Rate  
Tracker, HOUSINGWIRE (June 19, 2015), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/34251-cfpb-
launches-investigation-into-bankrate-mortgage-rate-tracker [https://perma.cc/F44N-JTFM]. 
 262. Benjamin Snyder, Yelp Says FTC Has Dropped Inquiry into Its Reviews, FORTUNE (Jan. 
6, 2015, 8:03 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/06/yelp-ftc-inquiry [https://perma.cc/2644-T5DV]. 
 263. See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).  
 264. Final Rules, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-
compliance/rulemaking/final-rules [https://perma.cc/7QLA-5JB2]; Letter from Mary K. Engle, 
Associate Director for Advertising Services, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Operators of Search  
Engines (June 24, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc- 
consumer-protection-staff-updates-agencys-guidance-search-engine-industryon-need-distinguish
/130625searchenginegeneralletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7Y3-5ATX]. The absence of CFPB 
rulemaking related to digital intermediaries likely results from the many other rules that Congress 
required the CFPB to write in its early years. See Final Rules, supra. 
 265. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Understanding Privacy Policies: Content, Self-
Regulation, and Markets 1, 4, 26 (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-18, 
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2736513 [https://perma.cc/62K6-UENF]. 
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Nor is there any sign that digital intermediaries will be required to 
disclose commissions anytime soon. TrueCar, which compares local 
automobile prices online, was recently hit with private lawsuits for not 
disclosing to consumers fees of $299 to $399 per automobile that it 
charged to dealers.266 However, it was the automobile dealers who 
brought the lawsuits, not consumers. Overall, a range of practices that 
move digital intermediaries further from neutrals and more toward 
promoters are unregulated.267 
B. Effective Public Digital Regulators 
The keys to maximizing the chance of any public digital 
intermediary succeeding are straightforward: adequate funding, 
anticapture mechanisms, performance metrics, and fully exercising 
information-collection powers. One of the main reasons to consider the 
public option is the possibility of having neutrals rather than only 
promoters available to consumers. The expected value of a public 
digital intermediary’s neutrality must be discounted for the risk of 
agency capture. Scholars have developed a range of institutional design 
features, such as independent funding, that make an agency more 
resistant to capture.268 It is also possible to imagine external oversight 
mechanisms through OIRA or other governmental entities.269 
Adequate funding and performance metrics are also crucial. For 
public marketplaces, these issues are largely resolved by markets. 
Public marketplaces can take a percentage of each transaction and the 
market will hold them somewhat accountable, provided private 
marketplaces are also allowed.270 Independent of what one thinks 
about the ACA overall, the exchanges (and their state predecessors) 
show that government-run marketplaces can facilitate transactions 
with appropriate start-up investment and supporting legislation.271 
For agencies to operate public informers, they would need to 
divert considerable funding from other activities or seek new 
 
 266. Dependable Sales & Serv. Inc. v. Truecar, Inc., No. 15-cv-1742 (PKC), 2016 WL 79992, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2016). 
 267. For a discussion of diverse business models that lead to promotion, see supra Part I.C.2. 
 268. See generally Barkow, supra note 237 (discussing institutional design and agency 
capture). 
 269. See generally, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, 
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013) (proposing OIRA reform for anticapture 
goals). 
 270. See supra Part III. 
 271. See supra Part III.A. 
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congressional funding. With public informers it also becomes far more 
important to develop rigorous performance metrics, such as measuring 
the number and type of decisions influenced. Such metrics would 
require more organizational transformation than may be readily 
apparent: a recent bipartisan estimate concluded that “less than $1 out 
of every $100 of government spending is backed by even the most basic 
evidence that the money is being spent wisely.”272 
It is worth mentioning an alternative path for creating powerful 
public informers. One of the main determinants of whether informers 
can help consumers make optimal decisions is the quality of data 
analyzed. Many regulators have far-reaching information-collection 
authority that businesses do not. For example, the CFPB conducts 
regulatory examinations of financial institutions during which it 
routinely collects nonpublic data about sales, products, and other 
internal operations.273 If the CFPB’s Rate Checker were to run 
sophisticated analyses of such data, it could offer unparalleled advice. 
However, this approach would have downsides. It would likely 
provoke industry backlash and legal challenges because such data is 
traditionally used only for assessing compliance with the law. 
Supervisory data cannot, for example, be obtained through FOIA 
requests.274 Also, the costs to businesses of such information collection 
could be high, although these costs could be minimized if the agency 
only uses data it already collects. Finally, the prospect of government 
agencies amassing and using big data to influence widespread decisions 
rings of a dystopian novel. At the same time, the administrative state 
already has troves of data that it uses in secretive ways. Making those 
uses explicit for digital intermediaries and in service of clear policy 
goals could improve consumer welfare and governmental 
transparency. 
Thus, creating effective public digital informers involves spending 
many millions of dollars on technology, reorganizing agencies to resist 
capture, or exercising intrusive information-collection powers. Public 
digital intermediaries, particularly marketplaces, may still be worth 
considering as an alternative to the heavy regulation—including 
mandated disclosures, consumer protection regulation, and antitrust 
enforcement—required to make private digital intermediaries 
 
 272. See Peter Orszag & John Bridgeland, Can Government Play Moneyball?, ATLANTIC, 
Aug. 2013, at 62. 
 273. See Van Loo, supra note 19, at 1380–81 (summarizing the CFPB’s supervisory powers). 
 274. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (2012). 
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effective. Regardless, the larger point is that whether the public or 
private option is chosen, it is crucial to make this decision with a full 
understanding of what each path involves. Effectively regulating 
through digital intermediaries is a more complex and extensive 
undertaking than policy discussions explicitly acknowledge. 
V.  ACCOUNTABLE DIGITAL REGULATORS 
The previous Parts focused on the substantive legal changes that 
would set digital intermediaries up to regulate markets effectively. This 
Part turns to procedural accountability, in its broader sense of “checks 
on decision making.”275 Although administrative law, privatization, and 
internet governance scholarship do not directly analyze the subject of 
this Article, they provide foundations for exploring two central 
questions. First, when adopting regulatory strategies that rely on 
private digital intermediaries, what additional responsibility should 
administrative agencies have for the market consequences? Second, 
when administrative agencies seek to run their own digital 
intermediaries, what external constraints are appropriate? 
Given agencies’ great discretion in policymaking, this Part focuses 
on what accountability should be rather than what accountability the 
law currently imposes.276 Nonetheless, the discussion could gain judicial 
relevance following the D.C. Circuit’s skepticism of unenumerated 
agency authority in a recent case, PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau.277 Regardless, the main goal below is to highlight 
accountability and legitimacy questions worthy of further research by 
experts in the relevant fields. These inquiries will become more 
 
 275. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 664 
(2000).  
 276. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285, 1287 (2003); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1383, 1390 (2004) (“[T]oday, promulgating an important legislative rule is a labor-
intensive enterprise.”).  
 277. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In PHH Corp. 
v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the court expressed concern about “broad and 
unaccountable power wielded by independent agencies.” Id. at 8. It ruled against the CFPB by 
imposing a three-year statute of limitations on its administrative actions to match what the agency 
would have faced in court. While acknowledging that Congress likely would say that the CFPB 
had no statute of limitations for its administrative actions, the three-judge panel noted that the 
statute creating the CFPB “says no such thing.” Id. at 54. It is thus possible that some courts would 
block some agencies from launching digital intermediaries if the authorizing statute says nothing 
about digital regulators.  
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important for policymakers as digital intermediaries’ regulatory roles 
expand. 
A. Accountable Private Digital Regulators 
A vast literature has probed the appropriate level of 
accountability for increasingly blurred lines between public and private 
actors. Linking private digital intermediaries to this scholarship 
touches on two related questions. First, to what extent are private 
digital intermediaries playing a public role? Second, how should we 
think about the governmental involvement in generating that private 
power? 
First, scholars have shown how companies can serve a “public 
regulatory function” through their contracts.278 For-profit insurers, for 
example, cause those they insure to engage in safer behavior by 
offering lower premiums to those who go to the gym regularly or equip 
their cars with speed-monitoring devices. In this role, insurers arguably 
“perform some rulemaking and adjudication, thereby replacing or 
complementing government regulation.”279 Walmart requires suppliers 
to comply with environmental standards above those required by 
law.280 Digital intermediaries also arguably perform a public regulatory 
function. In particular, they police problematic business practices. 
FinTech digital assistants can now alert consumers when their credit 
card issuers raise rates, and they can suggest alternative issuers.281 This 
service—making consumer-finance fees more salient to consumers—is 
a task that Congress has taken on in recent years through legislation 
such as the CARD Act282 and is one of the major roles of the CFPB. A 
prominent article on this topic notes that, in deciding whether “to 
intervene, either to regulate contract terms or to require information 
disclosure . . . the normative question should be whether the existence 
of imperfect information has produced noncompetitive prices and 
terms.”283 Price-comparison websites can address such imperfect 
 
 278. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting 
in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 914–15 (2007).  
 279. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 6, at 199, 201, 208. 
 280. See Vandenbergh, supra note 278, at 913. 
 281. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 282. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 283. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 42, at 631. 
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information, which is why their presence has prompted calls for 
deregulation.284 
The mere fact that a private company performs a public function 
does not answer the question of appropriate accountability. Walmart 
is not heavily regulated despite some arguably public functions. 
Countless private third-party actors, including magazines such as 
Consumer Reports, help consumers sift through market information 
without governmental oversight. 
If digital intermediaries are viewed as playing a public role 
because of how they police businesses, the scope of their market 
influence is relevant. Commentators have debated whether internet 
service companies like Google should be treated as public utilities or 
common carriers.285 A closer commercial reference point for digital 
marketplaces is the NYSE. The NYSE is a private entity but the SEC 
oversees its rules and structure.286 Influential congressional testimony 
for the legislation that ended the NYSE’s autonomy acknowledged 
that the exchange likely “has to be something of a monopoly. But after 
all it is essentially a public institution.”287 Among the Supreme Court’s 
articulated concerns in moving to a regulatory model were 
“manipulative or deceptive practices.”288 
A small number of digital intermediaries have become “super-
nodes” providing access to important sectors of the economy.289 With 
this position comes the capacity for manipulation and deception.290 
Digital marketplaces write the rules governing an ever-larger portion 
of commercial transactions. They even adjudicate disputes in ways 
analogous to courthouses, with eBay alone resolving over 60 million 
disputes each year between buyers and sellers.291 
 
 284. See Max N. Helveston, Regulating Digital Markets, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 33, 36 (2016) 
(discussing the experts’ calls for deregulation in response to digital technologies). 
 285. For examples of this debate, see generally Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 33; Yoo, supra 
note 33. 
 286. See Jennifer M. Pacella, If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn’t Fit: Self-Regulatory Organizations 
and Absolute Immunity, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 201, 206 (2012). 
 287. See Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 665 (1975) (describing the excerpted 
testimony as part of “[p]erhaps the most pertinent” testimony in the hearings for the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 on the subject of monopoly power). 
 288. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127–28 (1973). 
 289. See Tom Fairless, The EU Eyes a Tech ‘Super-Regulator,’ WALL STREET J., Apr. 24, 
2015, at B1. 
 290. See supra Part II.B. 
 291. See Van Loo, supra note 82, at 549. 
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There are valid reasons to distinguish stock exchanges as needing 
greater regulation than digital intermediaries.292 Still, the NYSE 
illustrates how at some point a private digital marketplace might merit 
greater public involvement due to its centrality to commercial markets. 
Such public involvement may be appropriate even if that marketplace 
position has characteristics of a natural monopoly, as the NYSE 
arguably did.293  
Second, it is worth inquiring into the steps taken by government 
actors to promote private digital intermediaries’ power. Some 
administrative law scholars have called for a broadening of the concept 
of delegation of agency authority. The idea is that when agencies rely 
on private entities to exercise regulatory discretion—such as telling 
banks to determine internally how to safeguard consumer 
information—the agency is delegating its authority in a manner 
analogous to Congress delegating its regulatory authority to 
administrative agencies. Consequently, agencies should apply “an 
accountability paradigm” to private actors asked to regulate for public 
ends.294 
Delegation is less relevant to private digital intermediaries 
because, when agencies release digital data or mandate data 
disclosures, no public actor is explicitly instructing a private entity to 
undertake any particular activity. Agencies simply make machine-
readable data available. To the extent private digital intermediaries 
regulate, they do so voluntarily.295 
Still, the digital intermediary may not otherwise exist—or might 
be less powerful—without an agency’s action.296 A governmental 
decision about mandating machine-readable disclosures may 
 
 292. One possible distinction is the heightened securities law concern with systemic risk. See 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 205–06 (2008). However, efficiency is “a 
central goal of U.S. securities law” and includes maintaining competition and preventing fraud. 
See id. Those considerations also apply to digital intermediaries. Moreover, many have concluded 
that some digital intermediaries are of “systemic” importance for the economy. See Fairless, supra 
note 289. 
 293. See Hans R. Stoll, The Causes and Consequences of the Rise in Third Market and Regional 
Trading, 19 J. CORP. L. 509, 514 (1994). 
 294. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, 
and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 383, 386, 400–01 (2006) (arguing 
for a broader application of the delegation doctrine); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (2003) (describing privatization as state-action 
delegation). 
 295. For a discussion of the limited oversight of digital intermediaries, see supra Part IV.A. 
 296. For a discussion of the lack of digital intermediaries in some industries, see supra Part 
II.A. 
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determine whether a monopolistic, manipulative digital intermediary 
serves as gatekeeper for an industry. The machine-readable disclosure 
is arguably made with the purpose of enabling a private entity to play 
a public function. The fact that an agency gave no instructions on how 
to use the disclosed data should not serve as an accountability shield. 
To the contrary, the assumption that minimal involvement suffices is 
part of the problem. Regardless of existing doctrinal boxes, unchecked 
agency reliance on potentially manipulative and deceptive machines 
serving as market gatekeepers at some point is in tension with an 
accountable administrative state. 
B. Accountable Public Digital Regulators 
When administrative agencies operate digital intermediaries, it is 
worth examining under what authority such action is taken and what 
constraints are appropriate. Some agencies offer these tools online 
without any public input beforehand or any public oversight 
afterwards, as the CFPB did with its mortgage calculator.297 Others, 
such as the USDA, have solicited public comments in the initial 
phase.298 
One explanation for some agencies’ lack of procedural constraints 
may be that public digital intermediaries fall under agencies’ 
communications or public education mandates. Most but not all 
agencies can publish information without any prior constraints.299 
Some interactive agency websites do little more than provide easier 
access to and organization of information. Entering a company’s name 
in the simple search engine on an agency complaint database, for 
example, is only making it easier and quicker for a citizen to find what 
could be published in print. 
For three reasons, justifying digital tools through an agency’s 
communication powers may fall short. First, some static information 
put out by administrative agencies is held to a higher accountability 
standard. The USDA solicits public input before publishing guidelines, 
 
 297. For example, the CFPB’s authority for its suite of online tools may be the statutory 
requirement that it establish an office of Financial Education “responsible for developing and 
implementing initiatives intended to educate and empower consumers to make better informed 
financial decisions.” See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act  
§ 1013(d)(1), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1970 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5493(d)(1)). 
 298. See Submission of SuperTracker for OMB Review; Comment Request, 77 Fed. Reg. 
43,045, 43,045 (July 23, 2012). 
 299. See Barkow, supra note 238, at 46–47. 
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which have significant implications for food markets.300 Digital 
intermediaries also can influence a large number of decisions, 
especially because their interactive nature allows agencies to give 
personalized advice. If passive information with the potential to 
influence a large number of market decisions can prompt public 
constraints, interactive digital tools presumably should sometimes as 
well. 
Second, it may matter that digital intermediaries’ influence can 
happen in a more hidden manner. To be sure, even print 
communications can influence people in subtle ways. On the other 
hand, the only reason the public knows that Facebook can influence 
voting is that the company released results from its internal study.301 
Scholars or public interest groups have all they need to analyze data 
relevant to passive information published on agencies’ websites or in 
pamphlets. They do not have easy access to public digital 
intermediaries’ algorithms or usage data. This means it is difficult for 
external groups to understand how those tools might influence people. 
This opacity raises the stakes of agency capture, as it would be difficult 
to determine how the digital intermediary may advance industry 
interests. 
Third, some public online tools may constrain behavior in ways 
analogous to legal rules. Regulations can occur by changing “a physical 
or digital environment to make undesirable conduct difficult.”302 If the 
CFPB wanted to mandate that credit card companies divulge new 
information on consumers’ monthly bills, it would first provide public 
notice and the opportunity for comments before issuing any such 
rule.303 Agencies’ writing of digital intermediaries’ computer code is 
not close enough to agency rulemaking to classify it as such. However, 
one implication of this architecture-as-law scholarship is that if an 
agency such as the CFPB were to build a web portal that required the 
same thing of credit card companies as a rule—such as divulging of 
specific information or otherwise making “undesirable conduct 
difficult”—such activity is arguably a form of regulation. The 
conversation about procedural constraints should unfold accordingly. 
 
 300. 7 U.S.C. § 5341 (2012). 
 301. See Jonathan Zittrain, Response, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 
33536 (2014). 
 302. See Calo, supra note 6, at 773; LESSIG, supra note 31. 
 303. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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In designing procedural constraints, it would be important to 
consider not only a tool’s launch but also ongoing operations. Law and 
technology scholars’ calls for transparency of the algorithms of large 
digital platforms such as Facebook and Google may be appropriate for 
governmental commercial algorithms.304 Contract law scholars’ 
proposals that companies disclose usage information305 may also prove 
suitable. Though aimed at private companies, if applied to public 
digital intermediaries these ideas would further the administrative law 
goal of “democratic enforcement.”306 Transparency and disclosures for 
public digital intermediaries would enable external observers to assess 
the impact of agencies’ tools and spotlight any captured influence or 
poor performance. 
Ongoing accountability mechanisms may be all the more 
important under a digital regulatory regime. Congress expects high-
level agency officials to “have effective control over the bureaucracies 
that they manage.”307 Digital intermediaries are becoming part of that 
bureaucracy. Scholars are predicting “self-driving laws” that use 
artificial intelligence to update automatically.308 Crucially, agencies’ 
digital intermediaries are competing with those in industry.309 To keep 
up, agencies will need to develop increasingly sophisticated and 
automated tools. Wall Street engineers who write robo-trading 
algorithms learned through near catastrophes such as the 2008 financial 
crisis and the “flash crash” of 2010 that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to know precisely what will happen once advanced computer code 
intersects with the real world.310 Agencies will need mechanisms to 
supervise these rapid upgrades and their inevitably unpredictable 
interaction with complex markets. 
 
 304. See generally PASQUALE, supra note 133 (broadly calling for greater transparency of 
companies’ “black box” algorithms). 
 305. See Bar-Gill, supra note 47, at 82. 
 306. See Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence in 
Public Enforcement, 102 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7−13). 
 307. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1261 (2006). 
 308. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Laws, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 429, 429 
(2016). 
 309. See supra Part III.B. 
 310. See SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH WHIZZES 
CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT 238 (2010); U.S. COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE 
MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 1–6 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/market
events-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GLV-549J]. 
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The bigger implication is that there is work to be done in 
determining when public digital intermediaries cross the line from 
simple information sharing to something more involved. As the digital 
tool asks for more information from the user, analyzes with greater 
algorithmic sophistication, and shapes more online behavior, 
accountability becomes more essential. Distinctions are already drawn 
among the types of public digital intermediaries. Marketplaces like the 
ACA are mentioned in statutes.311 This implies public digital 
marketplaces merit more procedural constraints than informers. As 
public intermediaries proliferate, more attention is needed to 
developing these distinctions and making them explicit. 
VI.  A HOLISTIC LAW OF INTERMEDIARIES 
Digital regulators’ shortcomings call for at least a shift to more 
realistic policymaking. A larger question is whether and how to pursue 
broad reform. Despite downsides,312 a uniform lawmaking initiative 
offers the chance to (1) produce rules and guidelines relevant to diverse 
institutions—agencies, legislatures, and courts at both the state and 
federal level; (2) design an interdependent set of laws; and (3) leverage 
interdisciplinary expertise. Also, because digital intermediaries evolve 
fast, an agency with an expanded technology mandate should be part 
of any comprehensive reform. 
The law of digital intermediaries today is analogous to mid-1900s 
commercial law. UCC drafter Grant Gilmore described pre-UCC law 
“as closely resembling that obscure wood in which Dante discovered 
the gates of hell.”313 In the early 1900s, with the increasing 
mechanization of transportation, trade increasingly crossed state 
borders.314 Novel trade arrangements also resulted from new 
technologies of mass production.315 Not only did the law fail to keep up 
with these changes, but it also presented a perplexing lack of 
uniformity.316 A sales transaction might have been governed by any 
 
 311. For a discussion of the ACA exchanges, see supra Part III.A. 
 312. See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private 
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (identifying the structural characteristics of “large 
private law-making groups” such as the American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). 
 313. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 620 (1981). 
 314. See Gilmore, supra note 37, at 1341–46. 
 315. See, e.g., id. 
 316. See, e.g., id. 
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number of state or federal acts, most of which were out of touch with 
practices in the marketplace.317 
Although the UCC modernized and standardized commercial 
rules, a patchwork of outdated state and federal laws now govern 
digital intermediaries.318 In recent years, sellers have tried to rein in 
price-comparison sites by raising state and federal claims of false 
advertising, unfair competition, and deceptive acts.319 Other battles 
feature “non-disparagement clauses” seeking to prevent consumers 
from leaving negative reviews online, reports of which surfaced as far 
back as 2009.320 When given the chance, judges have penalized 
individual businesses hundreds of thousands of dollars for using these 
“gag clauses.”321 In 2014, state statutes also began outlawing the 
practice.322 In the seven years before Congress banned these clauses in 
2016, incalculable costs were incurred by courts, legislatures, 
businesses, consumers, and markets. 
A centralized process would also prevent duplicative efforts 
across agencies. In 2016, the DOT adopted a rule stating, “Online 
travel sites that display and sell airline tickets are prohibited from 
biasing on behalf of certain airlines how they present available flights 
for purchase without disclosing this bias.”323 To reach this point, the 
DOT undertook a resource-intensive economic analysis and 
rulemaking process.324 Yet undisclosed bias is not a problem specific to 
 
 317. See Karl Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 
230, 264 (1941) (discussing the disconnect between the law and markets). 
 318. These laws include those governing financial advisers, anticompetitive practices, and 
unfair and deceptive acts. See supra Part IV.A.  
 319. See, e.g., Dependable Sales & Serv. Inc. v. Truecar, Inc., No. 15-cv-2016 WL 79992, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2016). 
 320. See Chris Walters, Going to The Doc? Be Sure You Don’t Sign a Gag Order, 
CONSUMERIST (Mar. 4, 2009), https://consumerist.com/2009/03/04/going-to-the-doc-be-sure-you-
dont-sign-a-gag-order [https://perma.cc?CG86-5MY6]. 
 321. See Chris Morran, Complain All You Want, California! State Outlaws Silly Non-
Disparagement Clauses, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 10, 2014), https://consumerist.com/2014/09/10/
complain-all-you-want-california-state-outlaws-silly-non-disparagement-clauses [https://perma.
cc/EJ7S-8DL6]. 
 322. See id. 
 323. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., supra note 1. 
 324. In 2014, the DOT released an extensive regulatory impact report on the topic. See 
HDR/HLB DECISION ECONOMICS INC., U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., INITIAL REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR PROPOSED CONSUMER RULEMAKING REGARDING TRANSPARENCY OF 
AIRLINE ANCILLARY FEES AND OTHER CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES 66  
(2014), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Reg_Eval_NPRM%20_rule_3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q6NN-FALR]. 
VAN LOO IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2017  3:08 PM 
1326  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1267 
the travel industry.325 The CFPB, the FTC, and every agency involved 
with search algorithms may now need to repeat the DOT’s resource-
intensive process to address the same problem.326 
Granted, not all markets should have the same rules. Default rules 
may often be more appropriate. An amended APA might require any 
administrative agency operating a digital intermediary to solicit public 
input during the computer-coding phase and make the underlying 
algorithms open-source. If Congress believes that an existing agency 
should be exempt from such a requirement, perhaps to prevent 
strategic behavior by banks, it could make such an exception. A federal 
law against undisclosed bias might serve as a default that the agency 
overseeing a given market could alter. 
Further complications arise from some agencies’ circumscribed 
authority even in the markets they regulate. For the CFPB to 
determine how much machine-readable mandated disclosures will 
benefit borrowers, it will need to know whether those disclosures will 
empower a digital intermediary to exercise monopoly power.327 The 
CFPB does not, however, enforce antitrust laws. That authority at the 
federal level largely rests with the FTC and the DOJ.328 Businesses 
have also brought antitrust suits against digital intermediaries.329 
As daunting of a task as addressing these interconnected issues 
may seem, a wealth of scholarship aimed at related issues already 
provides foundations.330 Law and technology scholars have argued for 
an “information fiduciary” standard that would require online service 
companies not to put their own interests above those of their users.331 
That standard is particularly relevant for those digital tools that have 
become many people’s trusted advisers.332 Computer scientists have 
developed encryption methods for analyzing algorithms without 
 
 325. See supra Part II.B.2.  
 326. Reputational tools policing problematic business practices offer some promise, but 
public support may be needed given business opposition. See Helveston, supra note 284, at 33; 
Van Loo, supra note 82, at 569–70, 597.  
 327. See supra Part II. 
 328. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 247. 
 329. See supra note 253. 
 330. Much of the literature discussed throughout this Article has relevant proposals.  
 331. See Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies 
Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/
information-fiduciary/502346 [https://perma.cc/FZ93-Y4ER].  
 332. See Jonathan Zittrain, Keynote Speech, Black Box Society Conference, Yale Law School 
(Apr. 2, 2016). 
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revealing trade secrets.333 Such techniques could help monitor 
problematic activity such as racially disparate treatment.334 
Isolated scholarly proposals, judicial decisions, and agency rules 
have begun to create pieces of a governance framework, but that work 
has yet to be brought together to draft a comprehensive blueprint. In 
the early 1900s it would have been impractical and inefficient for each 
state to undertake the duplicative process of creating a commercial 
code or for that effort to be repeated for each industry. Today it would 
be even more impractical, inefficient, and duplicative for various 
agencies, state legislatures, and courts to gather interdisciplinary 
experts to reinvent a complete set of rules governing digital 
intermediaries. An interdisciplinary group of economists, lawyers, 
psychologists, computer scientists, and others would be better 
architects for an integrated system of rules, and more equipped to think 
through difficult questions about whether private, public, or hybrid 
models would work best. 
Even with a holistic legal framework in place, a final institutional 
challenge is how to continually update that new framework with fast-
changing digital markets. Courts should continue to play a meaningful 
role, particularly to balance out capture risks.335 Still, as consumer 
protection, law and economics, and law and technology scholars have 
argued in analogous contexts, focused agencies offer the benefits of 
institutional expertise and faster ex ante, rather than ex post, 
rulemaking.336 Agencies are thus preferable to courts or legislatures. 
But coordinating scattered authority across the FCC, DOT, CFPB, 
 
 333. See Cade Metz, 7,500 Faceless Coders Paid in Bitcoin Built a Hedge Fund’s Brain, WIRED 
(Dec. 12, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/7500-faceless-coders-paid-bitcoin-
built-hedge-funds-brain [https://perma.cc/8R7V-KZRE]. 
 334. See generally Chander, supra note 133 (arguing that algorithms may reduce invidious 
discrimination as compared to human decisionmakers).  
 335. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1066 (2003).  
 336. The judicial process faces institutional limits on convening necessary expertise, 
responding quickly and comprehensively across diverse geographic markets, and taking a broad 
systems lens to interdisciplinary laws that may not be raised in any given case. See Bar-Gill & 
Warren, supra note 42, at 70, 98–99 (calling for a federal agency focused on consumer finance in 
part because of the institutional advantages, including expertise and ex ante rulemaking, of 
agencies over courts in regulating consumer financial markets); Ryan Calo, Why We Need a 
Federal Agency on Robotics, SCI. AM. (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/why-we-need-a-federal-agency-on-robotics [https://perma.cc/QZD4-YRAE] (citing a lack 
of robotics expertise as a reason for creating a federal robotics agency). But see Viva R. Moffat, 
Regulating Search, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 475–78 (2009) (suggesting that federal courts, not 
agencies, should regulate search engines). 
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FTC, and others would prove challenging. Moreover, the problems 
created by data-driven consumer products range far, including the 
threat of fake news to the democratic process and life-or-death 
decisions made by driverless cars. Expanding the regulatory mandate 
of an existing agency, most practically the FTC, would improve the 
institutional landscape.337 For a broader solution, ideas such as a 
Federal Search Commission338 and Federal Robotics Agency339 could 
be combined into a technology meta-agency that provides oversight, 
rulemaking, and technical updates for an inevitably digital 
administrative state. 
CONCLUSION 
The current regulatory paradigm increasingly depends on using 
online agents to pursue offline goals. This approach routinely assumes 
that digital intermediaries offer a powerful and light-touch regulatory 
option. In reality, they often lack the information they need to help 
consumers make optimal choices. If they obtain that information, 
private versions may inefficiently exploit consumers and constrain 
choice. Public versions are susceptible to political turbulence and 
capture. Traditional administrative law accountability mechanisms 
provide little clarity. 
Comprehensively addressing these weaknesses would require 
massive government supervision, agency restructuring, or sweeping 
legislation. This imperfect set of options does not necessarily bury 
digital intermediaries. The alternatives also have shortcomings. Rules 
prohibiting seller behavior may limit product innovation and growth. 
The stakes for ignoring intermediaries can also be high. In the decades 
leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, lenders paid brokers to steer 
home buyers toward costlier loans.340 Policymakers embrace today’s 
algorithms as market guardians, rather than recognizing them as 
possible digital reincarnations of yesterday’s market predators. Among 
 
 337. Indeed, the FTC has joint authority with the DOT over online travel agents. See James 
C. Cooper, The Costs of Regulatory Redundancy: Consumer Protection Oversight of Online Travel 
Agents and the Advantages of Sole FTC Jurisdiction, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 179, 181 (2015). Thus, 
the FTC presumably could have written an undisclosed-bias rule covering diverse industries it 
regulates instead of the DOT undertaking that process solely for one industry. See U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., supra note 1. However, FTC rulemaking is more constrained. See Cooper, supra, at 214. 
 338. See generally Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 33 (considering, but stopping short of 
suggesting, a commission for overseeing search engines). 
 339. See Calo, supra note 336. 
 340. See Eskridge, supra note 76, at 1129–30. 
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the paths forward, investing in digital regulators may, in many markets, 
produce the best results. At a minimum, the state’s expanding reach 
into private decisions deserves closer scrutiny. 
